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V.N. Melnik 
STRATEGIC CHOICE OF TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Resume 
What is the optimum mix of trade policy instruments? Usually governments choose among such 
instruments as quotas, tariffs, explicit of implicit subsidies. The goal of the project is to consider the possibility of 
a simultaneous use by the government of quotas (and corresponding License fees) and tariffs. The use of quotas 
and tariffs as complements rather than substitutes allows to carry out a trade policy which dominates – from the 
efficiency point of view - over a policy based on simple quotas or simple tariffs. The qualitative outcomes of the 
analysis depend on the type of government (whether it maximizes its revenue or public welfare), market structure 
and the cost structure of firms operating in the market.  
The study aims at improving our understanding of the link between government intervention - the optimal 
mix of trade policy instruments – and competition in the home goods market. 
1. Introduction 
 Whatever convincing the a reasoning for the benefit of free trade would be, trade barriers still exist. 
Usually trade barriers appear in the form of the protectionist tariffs, quotas, nontariff barriers and voluntary export 
restraint (VER). The tariffs for production increase the price, increase internal production reduce consumption,  
reduce import and create tariff inflows to the state; the quotas on import make the same, but create inflows for the 
foreign producers, bat not of for the state, which introduced the quotas. Besides the tariffs result in a loss of 
economy effectiveness, which come from distortion of motivation of behaviour of the domestic producers and 
customers. On the other hand, the increase of advantage from improving the conditions of trade, which is a 
consequence of reduced influence of the tariff on the prices of the foreign exporters. In case of “minor” country, 
which can not influence the prices world markets, the negative effect of the tariff on  economy is obvious. The 
technique of the of the tariff analysis can be applied for study of other aspects of a trade policy:  export subsidy, 
import quotas and VER. The export subsidies result in losses in economy effectiveness. The majority of arguments 
for the benefit of trade protectionism usually defend special interests.  
The given report is devoted to the problems of realization of the state two-part trade policy in case of two 
countries, two markets, many producers in conditions of imperfect competition, where the usual arguments of free 
trade are inapplicable. The optimum policy of government is considered from the point of view of two purposes: a 
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maximization of personal incomes; a maximization of domestic welfare. The base model is a two-level game. At 
the first level  governments announce a trade policy, and on the second,- home and foreign producers behave as 
Cournot  competitors.  
  The report considers: 
1) The quotas and tariffs, complementing each other at the optimal two-part trade policy: the import license for an 
entrance on the market (quota) and payment for unit of import (tariff); 
2) The factors which influence the optimum trade policy; 
3) The peculiarities of the two-part trade policy in conditions of transition to market; 
4) The peculiarity of the two-part trade policy in the internal and external market; 
5) The advantages of the modified trade policy. 
We have shown that the two-part trade policy dominates the simple quota and simple tariff, and the last two 
mentioned are the special cases of it. Thus the effectiveness of the two-part trade policy depends on the number of 
competing firms on the market, magnitude of a heterogeneity of functions of costs, degrees of convexity of 
functions of costs and thus to what firms the given policy will be applied and the governments of which  countries 
will execute the policy. Besides, the effectiveness and outcome of the trade policy we have considered under the 
following conditions: payoff functions of government G is income of government or W - domestic welfare. We 
have found conditions at which the optimum two-part trade policy of government will encourage foreign firms to 
behave as monolithic Stackelberg leader on the second level of the game.  
2. The review of the literature. 
The classical problem in the theory of the policies of international trade concerns the effect of the tariffs 
and quotas or the effect of a variety of possible policies. In absolutely competitive models of trade, tariffs and 
quotas - are usually equivalent, that is the effect of the tariff can be duplicated by the accordingly chosen model of 
quota. As it is stated by Bhagwati (1965), it will not be true at imperfect competition. He has demonstrated, that the 
tariffs dominate above the quotas, when there is an imperfect competition in home market. It can be explained by 
the fact that the keen response of foreign firms at the quota is more exact, than at the tariff. Thus, the quota in 
comparison with the tariff raises monopolistic force of internal firms. Anderson (1988) and Krishna (1989) 
generalized the previous results. Anderson considered the duopoly model and showed, that under the certain 
conditions quotas tend to lower competition. Krishna has shown in model of a Bertrand, that the quota constrains 
the ability of firms to compete effectively, when the goods are perfect substitutes. Accordingly, we could expect 
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some interesting comparisons between the tariffs and quotas as strategic instrumental means of trade policy. The 
analysis of the quotas at oligopoly give additional penetrations. Many works uncover the aspects of this problem, 
for example Itoh and Ono (1984), Harris (1985), Hwang and Mai (1988), Cooper and Riezman (1989), Ishikawa 
(1994), Krishna (1989), Ries (1993a, b), and others. 
There are also works, in which the dominance of the quotas above the tariffs is proved. Some economists 
considered public models of choice, which analyze the tariffs and quotas. For example, Cassing and Hillman 
(1985) have shown, that the quotas can dominate above the tariffs. Kaempfer (1989) has proved, that the quotas are 
more preferable than tariffs, and that exactly quotas can to internal overproduction. Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) 
used repeated model of the game to show prevalence of the quotas above the tariffs, making of the agreement of 
the economic agents more difficult.   
Perhaps the main difference between tariffs and quotas as policy instruments is related to their effects on 
foreign firms. Any tariff on foreign firms reduces their profits, and any subsidy to domestic firms also reduces the 
profits of foreign firms. Quotas, on the other hand, give a much greater possibility for foreign firms to benefit, 
particularly if the quota is implemented as a voluntary export restraint (VER), meaning that foreign firms keep any 
quota rents rather than having to buy quota licenses. In effect, VER acts as a device that facilitates a more collusive 
outcome for foreign firms. This implies that a VER is less likely to be in the interest of a government, which 
maximizes domestic welfare. A closely related possibility is that VER might lead to a change in the mode of 
rivalry between firms, as in Harris (1985), who assumes that the imposition of  VER at the external free-trade level 
converts the Bertrand rivalry to a structure in which the domestic firm becomes the Stackelberg price leader.  
Eaton and Grossman (1986), using the two-step game model for two firms producing substitute goods, 
have found, that at the certain conditions of regularity ensuring uniqueness and stability of an equilibrium, the 
optimum choice will be:  
- introducing of the export taxes, if the difference between expectations of the local producer concerning the 
partner’s behaviour and his true behaviour is negative;  
- establishing the export subsidies in case the above mentioned difference is positive. 
  In addition to the choice between the tariffs and quotas, there are many other closely related problems. 
Even if the attention is limited only to tariffs, there exists a problem either with the announcement of the price or 
certain tariffs. There should be a choice. As it is shown in Brander and Spencer (1984b), at imperfect competition 
certain and the ad valorem tariffs – are not equivalent and their relative attractiveness depends on the functional 
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form of demand and other special aspects of the model. In Corden (1971) the wide research of effect of the tariff 
effect, quotas and other aspects of a trade policy is given. In the work of Rousslang and Suomela (1985) the 
problem of how the tools of the trade policy can be used in practice is considered. 
The author of the project dealt with some interpretations in the modern literature of  the modified trade 
policy (truth not for two-part policy and for simple tariff). So Dixit (1984) has considered the import tariffs, the 
export subsidy or subsidy for domestic sales. Allowing a subsidy on local sales to shift the emphasis of the analysis 
away from trade policy, because a government has an incentive to use such a subsidy simply to offset the output-
restricting effect of oligopoly. Even in the absence of trade, this obvious intention to subsidize monopolies and 
oligopoly always exists. Thus application of a two-part trade policy for a case of the simple tariff is justified within 
the framework of considered models can have additional strategic effects. As far as is justified introductions of the 
quota on interior firms we can  see in the modern literature. So Dixit (1988a) uses a calibration technique to assess 
the effects of strategic trade policies on the U.S. automobile industry. His underlying model is a reciprocal-markets 
model with Japanese and American producers where firm conduct is characterized by a conduct parametr model. 
He focuses on just the U.S. market. Concern about the rising level of Japanese import peneration in the U.S. 
market led U.S. polisy-market in 1981 to impose a voluntary export restraint (VER) on Japanese imports. On it 
paths Dixit has received interesting outcomes of comparison of operating policies of USA with optimal policies. 
In the given review it is shown, that the quotas and tariffs are different choices. It is supposed in the project 
to consider a possibility of using the quotas and tariffs as addition to each other, but not as replacement. The two-
part trade policy provides for considering the import license for an entrance alongside with the tariff for the unit of 
import. Such policy was first introduced by Oi (1971) in the classical analysis of a price dilemma of Disneyland. 
Philips (1983) and Wilson (1993) also considered the examples of nonlinear assigning of the prices. For the case of 
sole market with homogeneous functions of costs, Fuerst and Kim (1997) have considered the two-part trade 
policy at complete, but imperfect information. In the market model of one country with homogeneous  functions of 
costs they have found conditions, when the optimal two-part trade policy dominates over the simple tariff and 
simple quota. It is also fair for the government, which is interested only in maximization of the income, and for 
benevolent government interested in internal welfare. The effect arises because the large payment for the import 
license imposes a smaller amount of distortions, than tariff. A government can reach the neutral income, reducing 
current tariffs and reimbursing the lost incomes by the payment for the license. With inhomogeneous functions of 
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costs Fuerst and Kim (1997) have considered numerical examples, which also have shown advantage of the two-
part trade policy. 
3. The game structure of strategic trade policy. 
The study of strategic trade policy is fundamentally an application of non-cooperative game theory and therefore 
uses the Nash equilibrium [as first defined by Nash (1950)] as the central equilibrium concept.   
The general noncooperative game with N person is called the system  
Г=< I,{ Xi }i ∈ I ,{ fi(x)} i ∈ I > 
Here I= {1,2,…, N} is a set of players’ numbers; {Xi }i ∈ I – a set of strategies the player with number i ∈I; the 
collection of strategies x=(x1, x2, …. xN), xi ∈ Xi, is called the situation of the game Г and X = X1⊗ X2⊗… XN – 
the set of all situations; for each player i ∈I, a function fi: X→R, called the payoff function of player i.  
Each player i selects strategy xi from strategy set X so as to independently and noncooperatively maximize payoff 
function fi(x1, x2, …xN). Let xe = (x1e, x2e, …xNe) be a feasible vector of strategies, one selected by each player. 
The answer to a problem on existence of  a Nash equilibrium gives the following theorem: 
Theorem(Nash): Let’s assume, what in the game Г for any player the set of strategies Xi is not empty, 
compact and convex, and payoff function fi (.) is concave on xi and continuous. Then there is a Nash equilibrium. 
To solve dynamic games with complete information, we use backward induction.  
4. Two-part trade policy. 
Let's consider a base model of the reciprocal markets at two-part trade policy. There are two countries, one 
is a  home country, the other is a foreign one. There are N - of home firms and N* - of foreign firms producing the 
homogeneous goods. Suppose iq  is a production level of i -home firm for the home market; jv - level of export of 
j - a foreign firm for the home market. Accordingly we use a label by an asterisk to designate variables, which are 
related to the foreign market. Suppose *iq - level of export of i home firm for the foreign market; 
*
jv - level of 
production of j foreign firm for the foreign market. Then the complete sales in these two countries equal Q and Q*:            
 ∑∑
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+=
*
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The inverse demand curves in a home and foreign country )(),( ** QpQp , where 2*, Cpp ∈ ; 0<′p , 
0)( * <′p . It is also known )( ii qс - function of costs of i home firm; )( ** jj qс - function of costs of j foreign firm, 
where 0,0,2 >′′>′∈ iii ccCc  and 0)(,0)(, **2* >′′>′∈ jjj ccCc .  
The economic result of the firms’ activity is determined by the consequent functions of profit: 
**
i
***** )()()( eqtqQpqqcqQp iiiiii −−++−=π , Ni ,...1=                   (4.3) 
etvvQpvvcvQp jjjjjjj −−++−= )()()( ******π , *,...1 Nj =               (4.4) 
Where e, e* - payment for the license to home and foreign government accordingly; t, t*- the tariff per unit of 
production imposed on home and foreign firms accordingly. 
Let's designate by a vector ),,( tvez = , ),,( *** tqez = two-part of trade policies of home and foreign 
government (here q , v  are the quotas on home and import firms). Then it’s obvious that )0,,( vez = - is the 
simple quota; ),,0( tz ∞= - the simple tariff.   
4.1 Trade policy the third-market model. 
In a strategic trade policy the third-market model is well known. In this model one or more firms from a 
domestic country and one or more firms from a foreign country compete only in the third market. Thus, these firms 
therefore produce only for export. This simplification appears very useful; allows one to see strategic effects of a 
concrete trade policy in its pure condition. In the third-market model, a domestic government can do nothing to 
directly hinder a foreign firm (i.e. there is no possibility for import tariffs or quotas), and the natural policy is an 
export subsidy, which direct effect is to help a domestic firm in a competition with its foreign rival. In the project it 
is supposed in model of the third market to use the two-part trade policy. The supposition is expressed, that in this 
model the optimum policy will appear naturally in the form of negative tariff (subsidy) at the positive payment for 
the license.  
 The sequential structure of model consists of two stages. At the first stage of government establish two-
part policy ),,( tve and *),*,( tqe  for interior firms. At the second stage an interior and an exterior firm 
simultaneously choose an output level (or export) for the third market. Using an inverse induction to find perfect 
subgame Nash equilibrium, Nash equilibrium at the second stage at first is considered, and then Nash equilibrium 
at the first stage between governments is considered, which completely realizes, that their policy will affect the 
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value of outputs of firms at the second stage. Thus the payoff functions of firms are defined by relations (4.3), (4.4) 
provided that  p(Q)=p*(Q). 
eqtqcqQp iiii −−−= i)()(π , Ni ,...1=                   (4.5) 
*** )()( evtvcvQp jjjjj −−−=π , *,...1 Nj =                (4.6) 
Where e, e* - payment for the license to home and foreign government accordingly; t, t*- the tariff per unit of 
production imposed on home and foreign firms accordingly. 
We shall consider a case of homogeneous cost functions: jvcvciqcqc ji ∀=∀= ),()(;),()( ** .  
Much of the analysis of strategic profit-shifting makes use of the Cournot model of oligopolistic behavior. By 
stage 2, tariffs t and t*  has been predetermined in stage 1 and is therefore treated as exogenous. 
The first order conditions associated with maximization of (4.5), (4.6)  is 
0=−′−+⋅′=∂
∂
tcpqp
q ii
iπ ;   0' **
*
=−−+⋅′=∂
∂ tcpvp
v jj
iπ ; ji ∀∀ , .      (4.7) 
Because of a homogeneity jvviqq ji ∀=∀= ,;, 11 . The second order conditions associated with maximization of 
(4.5),(4.6)  is 
02
2
<′′−′+′+⋅′′=∂
∂ cppqp
q ii
iπ , 0"*2
*2
<−′+′+⋅′′=∂
∂ cppvp
v jj
iπ ; ji ∀∀ , .     (4.8) 
First order condition (4.7) makes it clear that a Cournot equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in outputs, as (4.7) is 
implied by Nash condition for the case in which each player's strategy set is simply the set of possible output 
quantities it might produce in a one-shot simultaneous-move game. The Cournot equilibrium therefore has the 
same "no surprises" rationality property that any Nash equilibrium has. First order condition (4.7) could be solved 
in principle for the profit-maximizing choice of iq  for any given set of output choices by the other firms. This 
resulting implicit function is the reaction function or best-response function. The common intersection of the best-
response functions (one for each firm) is the Cournot equilibrium. 
 An additional regularity condition that turns out to be central to the characterization of the Cournot 
equilibrium is the following. 
0
2
<′+⋅′′=∂∂
∂ pqp
vq iji
iπ , 0
*2
<′+⋅′′=∂∂
∂ pvp
qv jij
iπ ; ji ∀∀ , .     (4.9) 
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This condition obviously holds for all nonconvex demand curves (including linear demand), but it can be violated 
if demand is very convex. Condition (4.9) is linked to many properties of the Cournot model1.  
Most importantly, condition (4.9) means that strategy variables qi and vj are strategic substitutes. If 
0
2
<∂∂
∂
ji
i
vq
π
, ,i∀  this means the marginal value, 
i
i
q∂
∂ π
, of increasing firm i strategy variable decreases when the 
strategy variable of a rival increases. 
Lemma 4.1.  Suppose that 
1) the cost functions )(1 qc  and )(
*
1 qc is twice-continuously differentiable and convex, for any 0≥q ; 
2) the inverse demand curve  )(Qp  is twice-continuously differentiable and decrease, for any 0≥Q ; 
3) the function qQqp ⋅+ )~(  is concave in q, for any  0~ ≥Q . Then in the third-market model at two-part 
trade policy: 
01 <∂
∂
t
q
, 0*
1 >∂
∂
t
q
, 01 >∂
∂
t
v
, 0*
1 <∂
∂
t
v
. 
Corollary 4.1.  
t
q
t
v
∂
∂=∂
∂ 11 α , where )0,1(−∈α  and  *1*1 t
v
t
q
∂
∂=∂
∂ β , where )0,1(−∈β .                                  
As the basic model we shall consider the two-step game with complete, but imperfect information. On the 
first step the players 1 and 2 (the home and foreign governments) simultaneously choose their strategy and inform 
about them 3 and 4 - players (home and foreign firms), which on the second step simultaneously choose their 
strategy.  
                                                          
1 It means that each firm's marginal revenue declines as the output of any other firm rises. It is the so-
called Hahn stability condition for certain proposed dynamic adjustment mechanisms. (Note, however, 
that the pure Cournot model is a one-shot static game with no real-time dynamics. Any proposed 
dynamic adjustment is an extension to the model). Presuming that second order conditions are globally 
satisfied, global satisfaction of (4.9) in this context is also the Gale-Nikaido condition for uniqueness of 
the Cournot equilibrium. Condition (4.9) also ensures dial various comparative static properties of the 
model are "well-behaved".  
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Let's designate through 11 ),,( Xtvex ∈= ,  22 *),*,( Xtqex ∈=  the strategies of the first and the 
second player, where RRRX k ××= ++  - set of strategy k of the player (k=1,2).  Let 313 Xqx ∈=  ; - strategy 
of 3- player and 444 Xvx ∈=  - strategy of 4 - player, where ++ ×= RRX k  - set of strategy of k - player (k=3,4).  
It ),((),()( *1
*
11 ttqcttqpxf −⋅≡ ;   ),((),()( *1**12 ttvcttvpxf −⋅≡ ; 
)()( 13 xxf π≡ ; )(*14 xf π≡ ;   4321 XXXXXx ×××=∈ . 
Then it is possible to define the two-step game 4 persons with complete, but imperfect information       
Г1=< I={1,2,3,4},{ Xi }i ∈ I ,{ fi(x)} i ∈ I > 
 
 
 
The following existence theorem of  Nash equilibrium in game Г1 is fair. 
Theorem 4.1.  Suppose that 
1) the cost functions )(1 qc  and )(
*
1 qc is twice-continuously differentiable increasing and convex, for any 
0≥q ; 
2) the inverse demand curve  )(Qp  is twice-continuously differentiable and decrease, for any 0≥Q ; 
3) the function qQqp ⋅+ )~(  is concave in q, for any  0~ ≥Q .  
4) QQQpthatQ €,0)(   ,€ ≥∀=∃ ,   
then in game Г1 exists perfect subgame Nash equilibrium. 
x3
(3,4) 
(1,1) 
(2,1) 
(2,2) 
(3,1) (3,2) (3,3) 
(4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (4,7)  (4,8) 
x1 x1
x2 x2 x2 x2
x3 x3 x3x3 x3 x3 x3
x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x4x4
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From the given theorem we get a remarkable corollary. 
Corollary 4.2.  In the third-market model optimum two-part tariff t  which maximizies the 
government’s incomes is negative (subsidy) and the optimum payment for the license is equal to flowing 
sales proceeds of a internal firm.  
Example 4.1. (model of the third market). One market, two governments, two firms. The inverse function 
of demand QbaQp ⋅−=)( . The costs functions of home and foreign firms: cqqC =)( ; qcqC ** )( =  . 
For searching the optimum two-part trade policy we apply a method of an inverse induction. Thus we 
consider various combinations of applying or not applying the two-part trade policies by different governments. 
The outcomes are given in Tab.4.1 
 From the given example it is visible, that the optimum two-part trade policy is the subsidy at the positive 
payment for the license.  
If the two-part trade policy is applied only by one government, it is also necessary to notice, that the 
optimum subsidy is increased because of advantage in relative costs of interior firm. Firms, which "need" help at 
competition with exterior firms represent less attractive objects for subsidizing from the point of view of 
government. Besides we see that in this case subsidy forces interior firm to more aggressive function of the best 
answer, that in turn forces a foreign firm to produce less. The optimum interior subsidy moves a firm on a leading 
Stakelberg output level, and a foreign subsidy makes at a level of the follower. The government can convert that 
advantage (that it applies the solution first) into equivalent advantage of an interior firm. The interior firm has 
stimulus for acceptance of a primary solution, which changes strategic interaction between firms.  
 If the two-part policy is applied by both governments (at a maximization Gk), their optimum policy still will 
be the subsidy at the positive tariff. However in case of a maximization of welfare (Gk +πk) the game at a level of 
governments looks like a prisoners` dilemma made, as both countries are in the worse position in a condition of a 
strategic equilibrium, than at free trade, however each has stimulus for a deviation from free trade.  
Let's consider for an example 4.1, whether the optimum two-part trade policy of the Pareto-optimal with 
respect to the policies of each government (G+G *), i.e. the case when between governments is present collusion. 
In this case we have the following first-best outcome: 
t+t * = (a-c)/2 > 0, which rather differs from the individually tariffs t=t * =- (a-c /5 < 0. For example, if t=t * = 
(a-c)/4, G=G*=(a-c)2/8b>2(a-c)2/25b; π= π*=0; q=q * = (a-c)/4b; e=e*=(a-c)2/16b. Here, the game also has the 
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prisoners' dilemma flavor in the sense that collusion between the two governments would have resulted in 
greater revenue for each (assuming equal division of total revenue) that individually rational policies. 
 
4.2 Two-part trade policy in model of the reciprocal markets  
with homogeneous structure of cost function. 
In this case iqcqс iii ∀= ),()(  and jqcqс jjj ∀= ),()( *** .  
The economic result of the firms’ activity is determined by the consequent functions of profit: 
**
i
***** )()()( eqtqQpqqcqQp iiiiii −−++−=π , Ni ,...1=                  
etvvQpvvcvQp jjjjjjj −−++−= )()()( ******π , *,...1 Nj =    (4.18)      
Where e, e* - payment for the license to home and foreign government accordingly; t, t*- the tariff per unit of 
production imposed on home and foreign firms accordingly. 
Lemma 4.2 :   If 
1) 0,0)(,0)(,)( 2 >>′′>′∈ qqcqcCqci ; 0,0))((,0))((,)( **2* >>′′>′∈ vvcvcCvc ;  
2) 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈ ; 0,0)( ≥<′ QQp , 0,0)(' *** ≥< QQp ; 
3) )0,0,(,0)()( ≥≥∀<⋅′′+′ ii qQiqQpQp ; )0,0,(,0)(")(' *** ≥≥∀<⋅+ jj vQjvQpQp ; 
4) )0,0,(,0)()( ≥≥∀<′′−′ ii qQiqcQp ; )0,0,(,0)(")(' *** ≥≥∀<− jj vQjqcQp ; Ni ,...1= ; Nj ,...1= , 
then in the model of the reciprocal markets under the two-part trade policy the condition are executed: 
;0,0
;0,0
**
>∂
∂<∂
∂
<∂
∂>∂
∂
t
v
t
q
t
v
t
q
ji
ji
           
;0,0
;0,0
**
*
*
*
*
>∂
∂<∂
∂
<∂
∂>∂
∂
t
q
t
v
t
q
t
v
ij
ij
     for NjNi ,...1;,...1 =∀=∀                     
The importance of this Lemma 4.2.  is that for the reciprocal-markets model it establishes a very 
important feature: « the import tariffs of the two-part trade policy reduce the level of internal sales of external 
firms and increase domestic sales of internal firms ». Though the given fact is known, but for the model under 
consideration it is new.  
From the proved Lemma 4.2. it is also easy to get: 
 Corollary 4.3.   
t
v
t
q
∂
∂=∂
∂ 11 α , where )0,1(−∈α  and  *
*
1
*
*
1
t
q
t
v
∂
∂=∂
∂ β , where )0,1(−∈β .                                  
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4.2.1 Policy of a maximization of the governmental incomes. 
The purposes of government are defined by functions.  
{ }∑
=
−=
*
1
**** )),((),(),(
N
j
jj ttvcttpvttG - income of  home government   (4.25) 
{ }∑
=
−=
N
i
ii ttqcttqpttG
1
******* )),((),(),( - income of  foreign government   (4.26) . 
The given type of government we shall called G- type. For the governments of G-type the level of optimum two-
part trade policy is defined by the conditions of equality to zero of the income from sales of foreign firms.  
As the basic model we shall consider the two-step game with complete, but imperfect information. On the 
first step the players 1 and 2 (the home and foreign governments) simultaneously choose their strategy and inform 
about them N+N* - players (N-home and N*- foreign firms), which on the second step simultaneously choose their 
strategy.  
Let's designate through 11 ),~,( Xtvex ∈= ,  22 *),~*,( Xtqex ∈=  the strategies of the first and the 
second player, where RRRX k ××= ++  - set of strategy k of the player (k=1,2).  Let iiii Xqqx ∈= ),( *  ; - 
strategy of i- player )2...4,3( += Ni , and jjjj Xvvx ∈= ),( *  - strategy of j - player )2*,...3( +++= NNNj , 
where ++ ×= RRX k  - set of strategy of k - player (k=3,…N+N*+2).  
It )()(1 xGxf ≡ ; )()( *2 xGxf ≡ ;  )()( xxf ii π≡  , 2,...3 += Ni ; 
)(* 2 xf Njj −−≡ π , )2,...(3 * +++= NNNj ;   221 *... ++×××=∈ NNXXXXx  
Then it is possible to define the two-step game N+N * + 2 persons with complete, but imperfect 
information       
Г=< I={1,2…N+N*+2},{ Xi }i ∈ I ,{ fi(x)} i ∈ I > 
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(1,1) 
(2,1) (2,2) 
(3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) 
(4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (4,8) (4,7) 
(e,v~,t) 
(e*,q~,t*) 
(q,q*) (q,q*) (q,q*) (q,q*) 
(v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) 
 
The following existence theorem of  Nash equilibrium in game Г is fair. 
Theorem 4.2.  If 
1) 0,0)(,0)(,)( 2 >>′′>′∈ qqcqcCqci ; 0,0))((,0))((,)( **2* >>′′>′∈ vvcvcCvc ;  
2) 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈ ; 0,0)( ≥<′ QQp , 0,0)(' *** ≥< QQp ; 
3) ),,(,0)()( ii qQiqQpQp ∀<⋅′′+′ ; ),,(,0)(")(' *** jj vQjvQpQp ∀<⋅+ ; 
4) ),,(,0)()( ii qQiqcQp ∀<′′−′ ; ),,(,0)(")(' *** jj vQjqcQp ∀<− ; 
5) QQQpthatQ €,0)(   ,€ ≥∀=∃ ; ***** €,0)(   ,€ QQQpthatQ ≥∀=∃ , 
( 2,...3 += Ni ; 2,...3 * +++= NNNj ),  then in game Г exists perfect subgame Nash equilibrium. 
From the given theorem we get a remarkable corollary. 
Corollary 4.4.  In the homogeneous case for N=N * = 1 optimum two-part tariff t  which maximizes 
the government’s incomes is negative (subsidy) and the optimum payment for the license equals to the 
current of a foreign firm.  
Let's consider nontrivial example of the two-part  optimum trade policy. 
Example 4.2. Two markets, two governments, two firms. 
The inverse functions of demand in the home and foreign market p (Q) =1-Q are known; p * (Q *) = 1-Q*. 
Functions of costs of home and foreign firms: C (q) =cq2/2; C * (q) =cq2/2. 
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The functions of firms’ profit and the functions of the income of governments are defined under the formulas 
(4.18),  (4.25) and (4.26). 
It could be readily verified that in this modelling example the conditions of Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.2 are 
carried out.  
 So the optimum out puts of firms depending on a level of two-part tariff: 
)12)(32(
3*2*45*364
3
1*),(;
)12)(32(
3*2*411664
3
1*),(
)12)(32(
324*11*66*4
3
1*),(;
)12)(32(
324*536*4
3
1*),(
22
*
1
22
*
1
22
*
1
22
1
++
++++++⋅=++
−++++−⋅−=
++
−++++−⋅−=++
++++++⋅=
cc
tcctcttctcttv
cc
tcctcttctcttv
cc
tcctcttctcttq
cc
tcctcttctcttq
 
Thus of a payoff function of governments: 
22
3322
22
)12()32(
)4*21520*2662118()31166*44*2(
18
1*),( ++
++++−+++−++−++⋅−=
cc
tctctcctcttcccttccttctcttG   
22
3322
22
)12()32(
*)42*15*202*662118()3*11*664*42(
18
1*),(* ++
++++−+++−++−++⋅−=
cc
tctctcctcttcccttccttctcttG
   
Functions are continuous and concave by t and t* accordingly.  
 Thus the optimum tariff:  
0
)617134)(2(
103413
23
32
<++++
+++−=
cccc
ccct ;    0
)617134)(2(
103413* 23
32
<++++
+++−=
cccc
ccct . 
Thus optimum output of firms (at this level the quotas 1
*
1 ; vvqq == ) are also established:  
)617134)(2(
)12)(3( ;
)617134(
)34)(1(;
)617134(
)34)(1(;
)617134)(2(
)12)(3(
23
*
123
*
123
*
1231 ++++
++=+++
++=+++
++=++++
++=
cccc
ccv
ccc
ccv
ccc
ccq
cccc
ccq
 
The optimum payment for the license: 
0
)2()617134(
)412466127)(34)(1(
2
1**)(** 223
43
>++++
+++++⋅=⋅−−⋅=
cccc
ccccccqtqCqpe ; 
0
)2()617134(
)412466127)(34)(1(
2
1)(** 223
43
>++++
+++++⋅=⋅−−⋅=
cccc
ccccccvtvCvpe . 
 The example shows, that the optimum two-part policy in case of two countries, two governments and two 
firms is the subsidy at the positive payment for the license. Thus such policy encourages firms to export greater 
than interior output level.  
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4.2.2 Policy of a maximization of the domestic welfare. 
The purposes of government are defined by functions.  
∑ ∑∫
= =
−−=
N
i
N
j
ji
ttQ
ttvсttqcdsspttW
1 1
***
),(
0
*
**
)),(()),(()(),(       (4.31) - domestic welfare of a home country.  
∑ ∑∫
= =
−−=
N
i
N
j
ji
ttQ
ttvсttqcdsspttW
1 1
*****
),(
0
***
***
)),(()),(()(),(  (4.32) - domestic welfare of  a foreign country.  
The given type of government we shall called W- type. 
In this case a government maximizes domestic welfare consisting of the sum of an excess of the customer, 
profit of an internal firm and it’s own incomes from the tax. For the governments of W – type the level of 
optimum two-part trade policy is defined by the conditions of equality to zero of the income from sales of foreign 
firms.  
As the basic model we shall consider the two-step game with complete, but imperfect information. On the 
first step the players 1 and 2 (the home and foreign governments) simultaneously choose their strategy and inform 
about them N+N* - players (N-home and N*- foreign firms), which on the second step simultaneously choose their 
strategy.  
Let's designate through 11 ),~,( Xtvex ∈= ,  22 *),~*,( Xtqex ∈=  the strategies of the first and the 
second player, where RRRX k ××= ++  - set of strategy k of the player (k=1,2).  Let iiii Xqqx ∈= ),( *  ; - 
strategy of i- player )2...4,3( += Ni , and jjjj Xvvx ∈= ),( *  - strategy of j - player )2*,...3( +++= NNNj , 
where ++ ×= RRX k  - set of strategy of k - player (k=3,…N+N*+2).  
It )()(1 xWxh ≡ ; )()( *2 xWxh ≡ ;  )()( 2 xxh ii −≡ π  , 2,...3 += Ni ; 
)(* 2 xh Njj −−≡ π , )2,...(3 * +++= NNNj ; 221 *... ++×××=∈ NNXXXXx  
Then it is possible to define the two-step game N+N * + 2 persons with complete, but imperfect 
information       
ГW=< I={1,2…N+N*+2},{ Xi }i ∈ I ,{ hi(x)} i ∈ I > 
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(1,1) 
(2,1) (2,2) 
(3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) 
(4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (4,8) (4,7) 
(e,v~,t) 
(e*,q~,t*) 
(q,q*) (q,q*) (q,q*) (q,q*) 
(v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) (v,v*) 
 
The following existence theorem of  Nash equilibrium in game Г is fair. 
Theorem 4.3 :  If 
1) 0,0)(,0)(,)( 2 >>′′>′∈ qqcqcCqc ; 0,0))((,0))((,)( **2* >>′′>′∈ vvcvcCvc ;  
2) 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈ ; 0,0)( ≥<′ QQp , 0,0)(' *** ≥< QQp ; 
3) ),,(,0)()( ii qQiqQpQp ∀<⋅′′+′ ; ),,(,0)(")(' *** jj vQjvQpQp ∀<⋅+ ; 
4) ),,(,0)()( ii qQiqcQp ∀<′′−′ ; ),,(,0)(")(' *** jj vQjqcQp ∀<− ; 
5) QQQpчтоQ €,0)(   ,€ ≥∀=∃ ; ***** €,0)(   ,€ QQQpчтоQ ≥∀=∃ , 
( 2,...3 += Ni ; 2,...3 * +++= NNNj ),  then in game Г exists perfect subgame Nash equilibrium. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
Let's consider nontrivial examples of the two-part  optimum trade policy. 
Now we shall consider examples, which confirm expressed before a hypothesis. 
We make the comparative analysis of outcomes of examples 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 (See. Application) and before the 
obtained outcomes Fuerst and Kim (1997). All outcomes we shall note in the table 4.2: 
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Tab. 4.2 
 Melnik V.N. Fuerst & Kim 
N* N c ZG ZG* ZW ZW* ZG ZG* ZW ZW* 
1 1 low subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy -2 subsidy - 
1 1 high subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy - subsidy - 
2 1 low subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy tariff =0 - subsidy - 
2 1 high subsidy subsidy subsidy tariff >0 tariff =0 - subsidy - 
≥3 1 low tariff >0  subsidy subsidy subsidy tariff >0 - subsidy - 
≥3 1 high subsidy subsidy subsidy tariff >0 tariff >0 - subsidy - 
2 2 low subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy - - - - 
2 2 high subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy - - - - 
3 3 low subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy - - - - 
3 3 high subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy - - - - 
 
From the table it is visible that for the considered examples3 
1) A subsidy appear (both for G-government and for W-government) more often and under other conditions, 
than in Fuerst and Kim(1997) models and it depends on a difference among foreign and  home firms and from 
a cost value.  
2) For G-government, when all firms have high costs, independently of a number of firms  in the market the 
optimal policy is a subsidy; 
3) At a internal government (in case of G) the optimal policy appear by the way of a positive tariff, when all 
firms have low costs, and a number of external firms is more internal firms on 2 or more. Thus the optimal 
policy of a external government will be always a subsidy; 
4) At a internal government (in case of W) the optimal policy will be always a subsidy, if it is more internal firms 
in than the market, than external firms. Thus the optimal policy of a external government will be a subsidy at 
low costs and a positive tariff at high costs. In case of equality of a number of firms in the market the optimal 
policy  is always a subsidy. 
                                                          
2 Here label “-” means, that this case was not analysis (Fuerst & Kim(1997)) 
3 Generally results to receive very difficultly 
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In examples 4.3 and 4.4 with increase of parameter "с" the value of the governmental income in the beginning will 
increase at the expense of the greater value of the subsidy (these costs of government compensate by a high 
positive payment for the license), and then the income decreases as the costs of firms will increase so that the 
governments can not compensate costs on subsidizing by a payment for the license. In this case all the firms have 
identical cost structure, a revenue-maximizing government uses its two-part strategy to encourage the exterior 
firms to behave as monolithic Stackelberg leader in the second stage of game. This implies that the revenue-
maximizing per unit of fee is either negative (when the cost functions of firms are high, at any amount of firms), or 
positive (when the cost functions  of firms are small, and number of exterior firms large). These stimulus are 
modified in case of government W that also is concerned with consumer surplus. In particular welfare-maximizing 
government will always choose a negative per unit fee (a subsidy) to stimulate total production. This situation is 
possible at a high payment for the license. Thus if the cost functions of firms are high (interior and exterior) then 
per unit of fee of interior firm is positive (the interior firms do not buy the license). 
In addition for example 4.6 the case is considered, whether the optimum two-part trade policy of the 
Pareto-optimal concerning summarized welfare (W+W *), i.e. the case when between governments is present 
collusion.  
In this case we have the following first-best outcome: 
t=t * =-0.2857 < 0 which a little bit differs from the individually optimal tariffs t=t * =-0.3925 < 0(in this case 
W=W * = 0.3552) . Besides in this case when between governments is present collusion W=W* = 
0.35715>0.3552; q=0.1429, q* = 0.4286; v=0.4286, v* = 0.1429; e = e* = 0.2602. Here, the game also has the 
prisoners' dilemma flavor in the sense that collusion between the two governments would have resulted in 
greater summarized welfare for each  that individually rational policies. 
4.3 Two-part trade policy in model of the reciprocal markets  
with inhomogeneous structure of cost function. 
In this case all the  functions of costs are different and we can not reduce the tariff at the expense of 
increasing the payment for the license, because the firms with high costs can fall out of the market if the payment 
for the license is high.  
If n and n* are extreme firms, that is the firms with numbers n+1 and (n* +1) have negative profit at the 
optimum two-part trade policy ),,( tvez = , ),,( *** tqez = .  
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4.3.1 Policy of a maximization of the governmental incomes. 
In this case payoff functions of governments: 
))),((),(()),(),((),( ******** ****** ttvсttpvnttvnttItttG nnnnnn −+−=    (4.38) 
))),((),(()),(),((),( ************ ttqсttqpnttnqttItttG nnnnnn −+−=      (4.39) 
where *,* nn II - level of import in a home and a foreign country accordingly. The optimum policy is defined by 
optimization on t (t *) and n (n *). In this model the optimum policy of government will  also depend on a degree 
of convexity and a degree of heterogeneity of functions of costs.  
The example shows, that the optimum two-part policy in case of two countries, two governments and two firms is 
the subsidy at the positive payment for the license. Thus such a policy encourages firms to export greater than 
interior output level. 
Further we shall consider examples for an inhomogeneous case. 
 
4.3.2 Policy of a maximization of the domestic welfare. 
In this case payoff functions of governments: 
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where *,* nn II - level of import in a home and a foreign country accordingly. The optimum policy is defined by 
optimization on t (t *) and n (n *). In this model the optimum policy of government will  also depend on a degree 
of convexity and a degree of heterogeneity of functions of costs.  
The example shows, that the optimum two-part policy in case of two countries, two governments and two firms is 
the subsidy at the positive payment for the license. Thus such policy encourages firms to export greater than 
interior output level. 
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Conducted in examples 4.8-4.11 analysis allows to state more deep and new outcomes (than Fuerst &Kim(1997)) 
for an inhomogeneous case. Besides now it is possible to conduct the comparative analysis of outcomes examples 
4.8-4.11 (see application). All outcomes we shall tabulate 4.4: 
Tab. 4.4 
 Melnik V.N. Fuerst & Kim 
N Heteroge
neity 
N* ZG ZG* ZW ZW* N* ZG ZG* ZW ZW* 
1 Low  3 subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy 3 tariff ≥0 -4 tariff ≥0 - 
1 middle 2 subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy 2 tariff ≥0 - tariff ≥0 - 
1 high 1 subsidy subsidy tariff ≥0 subsidy 1 subsidy - subsidy - 
Here parameter N* - endogenous  
From the table it is visible that for the considered examples5 
1) For G-government at any degree of a heterogeneity the internal government will establish the high payment 
of an entrance for external firms before, than its the policy will be replaced from a subsidy with a positive tariff, 
i.e. the optimal policy will be always a subsidy.  
1) For W-government the situation is similar, except for a case when a number of external and internal firms 
is equal to one, and the costs of internal firms exceed costs of external firms, then the optimal policy of 
internal government is a positive tariff. 
 
5. Modified two-part trade policy. 
In the work of Melnik (2000) for the simpler models it was offered to enter parameter τ-  a tariff for the 
local producer in hope, that in oligopoly case it will result in the subsidy. For a government such as G- type the 
tariff turned to be positive. For a government such as W-type has really resulted in the subsidy (τ< 0). Moreover, 
there will be a great number of the two-part policies, as for the optimum tariffs a condition must be observed:  
)1( ct −−=+τ , that gives a home government additional tools of regulating.  
                                                          
4 Here label “-” means, that this case was not analysis (Fuerst & Kim(1997)) 
5 Generally results to receive very difficultly 
  
22
We shall use this effect. It is offered to apply the two-part trade policy not only to foreign, but also to local firms 
),~,~( τve , ),~,~( ** τqe . The modified two-part trade policy, thus is defined ),~,~,,,(~ τvetvez = , 
),~,~,,,(~ ***** τqetqez = .  
Thus the given trade policy generalizes many existing trade policies: 
1) )0,,0,0,,0(~0 ∞∞=z - free trade; 2) )0,,0,,,0(~1 ∞∞= tz  - simple tariff; 3) )0,,0,0,,(~2 ∞= vez - simple quota; 
4) )0,,0,,,(~3 ∞= tvez - two-part trade policy on a foreign firm; 5) 0),,,0,0,,0(~4 <∞∞= ττz  - subsidizing of 
export; 6) )0,~,~,0,,0(~5 vez ∞= - voluntary export restriction; 7) ),~,~,0,,0(~6 τvez ∞= - two-part trade policy on 
home firm; 8) 0e~,0),,~,~,0,,0(~7 ><∞= ττvez   - export credit subsidies. 
Thus the payoff functions of firms are changed: 
eqeqtqQpqqcqQp iiiiii ~)()()(~
**
i
***** −−−−++−= τπ , Ni ,...1=      (5.1) 
********* ~)()()(~ evetvvQpvvcvQp jjjjjjj −−−−++−= τπ , *,...1 Ni =     (5.2) 
5.1. Policy of a maximization of the governmental incomes. 
In this case payoff functions of governments: 
{ } { }∑ ∑
= =
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ii vcvptqctqpG ττ   - income of  home government (5.4) 
 The hypothesis is advanced, that in case a government of a maximizes its income the  modified two-part 
trade policy will not be the subsidy at any conditions. These ideas are best illustrated in the context of concrete 
examples.  
Example 5.1.1  Let's assume are known inverse demand function in the home and foreign market and cost 
functions of firms: 
QbaQp ⋅−= 11)( , 21 qqQ += ;  *22*)( QbaQp ⋅−= , *2*1* qqQ += ;  0,0,, 2121 >>>> bbcaca  
dqcqC +⋅=)( ;  dqcqC +⋅=)(* . 
In this case optimal modified two-part trade policy is defined by conditions: 
0
2
1
1 >−=+ catt ;    02
2*
1
* >−=+ catt ;   (5.5) 
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Proposition 5.1.1.  In case of linear cost functions and linear inverse functions of demand, there is an 
infinitely many optimal modified two-part trade policy maximizing the governmental incomes. Thus the 
case is possible when the interior production level are not equal to zero and the case of the subsidy is 
impossible. 
  Proof.  As we have infinite number of solutions of the equations (5.5), there is an infinite number optimal 
modified two-part trade policy maximizing the governmental incomes. Let t < 0 (subsidy), then from (5.5) 
2
1
1
cat −> , and fromа (5.6) 0
2 11
1
1 <−−= tb
caq . But the production level can not be negative, then 0≥t , i.e. 
the subsidy is impossible.  
Example 5.1.2 We shall assume, that in conditions of an example 5.1.1 there is еру collusion between 
governments which maximize in common summarized income (
*GG + ). Besides let 2121 , bbaa == . In this case 
we obtain outcome completely conterminous with outcome of an example 5.1.1. In this case: 0
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Thus it is fair: 
Proposition 5.1.2. In case of identical cost functions and identical linear inverse functions of demand, the 
modified two-part trade policy maximizing the governmental incomes gives the Pareto optimum outcome 
concerning the joint income.  
Corollary. In case of linear cost functions and linear inverse functions of demand optimal modified,   two-
part trade policy  maximizing the governmental incomes dominates on other trade policy instruments.  
 
5.2.  Policy of a maximization of the domestic welfare. 
The purposes of government are defined by functions.  
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In case of a maximization of domestic welfare the modified policy is the subsidy. 
Example 5.2.1 Let's assume are known inverse demand function in the home and foreign market and cost 
functions of firms:  
QbaQp ⋅−= 11)( , 21 qqQ += ;  *22*)( QbaQp ⋅−= , *2*1* qqQ += ;  0,0,, 2121 >>>> bbcaca  
dqcqC +⋅=)( ;  dqcqC +⋅=)(* . 
In this case optimal modified two-part trade policy is defined by conditions: 
0)( 11 <−−=+ catt ; 0)( 2*1* <−−=+ catt ;     (5.9) 
1
1
1 b
tq −= ; 
2
*
*
1 b
tq −= ; 
1
2 b
tq −= ; 
2
*
1*
2 b
tq −= .     (5.10) 
1
1
2
1
2
4)(
b
bdcaW ⋅−−= ;  
2
2
2
2*
2
4)(
b
bdcaW ⋅−−= . 
Proposition 5.2.1  In case of linear cost functions and linear inverse functions of demand there is an 
infinitely many optimal modified two-part trade policy (as the subsidy) maximizing the domestic welfare. Thus the 
case is possible when the interior production level represents the competitive outcome. 
Proof.  As we have infinitely many of solutions of the equations (5.9), there is an infinitely many optimal 
modified two-part trade policy maximizing the domestic welfare.  
 Let t > 0, then from (5.10) 02 <q . But production can not be negative, then 0≤t . Analogously 01 ≤t , 
0* ≤t , 0*1 ≤t . From (5.9) follows that 1, tt  and *1* , tt  not equal to zero simultaneously, i.е. optimal modified 
two-part trade policy is subsidy.  
Example 5.2.2 We shall assume, that in conditions of an example 5.2.1 there is еру collusion between 
governments which maximize common the domestic welfare ( *WW + ). Besides let 2121 , bbaa == . In this case 
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we obtain outcome completely conterminous with outcome of an example 5.2.1. In this case: 0)(1 <−−=+ catt ; 
0)(*1
* <−−=+ catt ; 
b
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1 −= ; b
tq −=2 ; b
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bdcaW
2
4)( 2 ⋅−−= ;  
b
bdcaW
2
4)( 2* ⋅−−= . 
Thus it is fair: 
Proposition 5.2.2. In case of identical cost functions and identical linear inverse functions of demand, the 
modified two-part trade policy maximizing the domestic welfare gives the Pareto optimum outcome concerning the 
joint domestic welfare.  
Corollary. In case of linear cost functions and linear inverse functions of demand optimal modified,   two-
part trade policy  maximizing the domestic welfare dominates on other trade policy instruments.  
6. Choice of trade policy instruments. 
At the first level  governments announce a trade policy, and on the second,- home and foreign producers 
behave as Cournot  competitors.  
Let's consider three step game. At the first level governments announce a trade policy instrument, on the 
second governments set a concrete value of parameters of this trade policy, and on the third,- home and foreign 
producers behave as Cournot  competitors.  
On a first step of government can choose the following policies: 
1) )0,,0,0,,0(~0 ∞∞=z - free trade; 2) )0,,0,,,0(~1 ∞∞= tz  - simple tariff  on exterior firm; 
3) ),,0,0,,0(~ 12 tz ∞∞=  - simple tariff  on internal firm; 4) ),,0,,,0(~ 13 ttz ∞∞=  - simple tariff  on exterior 
and internal firms; 5) )0,,0,,,(~4 ∞= tqez - two-part trade policy; 6) ),,0,,,(~ 15 ttqez ∞=  - modified two-part 
trade policy.  Interaction of trade policy instruments 1) -6) we shall consider on examples. 
Example 6.1. Let's assume are known inverse demand function in the home and foreign market and cost 
functions of firms: 
QQp −= 1)( , 21 qqQ += ;  *** 1)( QQp −= , *2*1* qqQ += ;  qqC ⋅= 1.0)(1 ;  qqC ⋅= 1.0)(*1 . 
Thus the governments maximize domestic welfare.  
Optimal trade policies for every possible combinations of choices of governments we reduce in the table 6.1 
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 The analysis of the table 6.1 shows that optimal trade policy will be two-part trade policy or modified 
two-part trade policy. For a case )~,~( *55 zz  there is an infinitely many of optimal trade policies and is defined by a 
conditions 9.01 −=+ tt ; 9.0*1* −=+ tt  (for this case in the table 6.1 one of possible variants is reflected only). 
Two-part trade policy and modified two-part trade policy are equivalent concerning a maxima of domestic 
welfare. However at the modified two-part trade policy the payment for the license is much lower, and the profit 
is distinct from zero.  
Proposition 6.  In case of nonlinear cost functions and linear inverse functions of demand modified two-part 
trade policy  maximizing the domestic welfare dominates on other trade policy instruments.  
 The proof of the given statement is not present. Let’s illustrate the given proposition by an example. 
   Example 6.2. Let's assume are known inverse demand function in the home and foreign market and cost 
functions of firms: 
QQp −= 1)( , 21 qqQ += ;  *** 1)( QQp −= , *2*1* qqQ += ;  21 5.0)( qqC ⋅= ;  2*1 5.0)( qqC ⋅= . 
Thus the governments maximize domestic welfare.  
Optimal trade policies for every possible combinations of choices of governments we reduce in the table6.2. 
 The analysis of the table 6.1 shows that optimal trade policy will be modified two-part trade policy.  At 
the modified two-part trade policy the profit of firms payment is more and the market price of the goods is lower 
than for other instruments. 
  
7. Conclusion 
What is the optimum mix of trade policy instruments? In the report the possibility of a simultaneous use by 
the government of quotas (and corresponding License fees) and tariffs is analyzed. The use of quotas and tariffs as 
complements rather than substitutes allows to carry out a trade policy which dominates – from the efficiency point 
of view - over a policy based on others trade policy instruments. The qualitative outcomes of the analysis depend 
on the type of government (whether it maximizes its revenue or public welfare), market structure and the cost 
structure of firms operating in the market.  
The report analyses the problems of realization of the state two-part trade policy in case of two countries, 
two markets, many producers in conditions of imperfect competition.  
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We have shown that the two-part trade policy dominates the simple quota and simple tariff, and the last 
two mentioned are the special cases of it. Thus the effectiveness of the two-part trade policy depends on the 
number of competing firms on the market, magnitude of a heterogeneity of functions of costs, degrees of convexity 
of functions of costs and thus to what firms the given policy will be applied and the governments of which  
countries will execute the policy.  
In the beginning we have shown, that for the third-market model the optimal  two-part trade policy is a 
subsidy. For this case the analytical results (Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1) are obtained. In this part we investigated 
substantial sense of properties of cost functions and inverse demand functions which define existence of optimal 
trade policy.  
In model of the reciprocal markets with homogeneous structure of cost functions the conditions of 
existence of optimal trade policy, as for a case of a maximization of the governmental income (Theorem 4.2), and 
for a case of a maximization of the domestic welfare (Theorem 4.3) are found. All these results are illustrated with 
a set of examples. For a homogeneous case we have established that 
1) A subsidy appear (both for G-government and for W-government) more often and under other conditions, than 
in Fuerst and Kim models and it depends on a difference among foreign and  home firms and from a cost value.  
2) For G-government, when all firms have high costs, independently of a number of firms  in the market the 
optimal policy is a subsidy; 
3) At a internal government (in case of G) the optimal policy appear through a positive tariff, when all firms have 
low costs, and a number of external firms is more than internal firms on 2 or more. Thus the optimal policy of a 
external government will be always a subsidy; 
4) At a internal government (in case of W) the optimal policy will be always a subsidy, if there is more internal 
firms in than the market, than external firms. Thus the optimal policy of a external government will be a subsidy at 
low costs and a positive tariff at high costs. In case of equality of a number of firms in the market the optimal 
policy  is always a subsidy. 
In model of the reciprocal markets with inhomogeneous structure of cost functions on the basis of 
numerical modeling in a package Maple we have established that : 
1) For G-government at any degree of a heterogeneity the internal government will establish the high payment of 
an entrance for external firms before, than its the policy will be replaced from a subsidy with a positive tariff, i.e. 
the optimal policy will be always a subsidy.  
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2) For W-government the situation is similar, except for a case when a number of external and internal firms is 
equal to one, and the costs of internal firms exceed costs of external firms, then the optimal policy of internal 
government is a positive tariff. 
We have analysed also negative aspect of the two-part trade policy, which consists of the fact that in 
conditions of transitional economy the given policy has a negative consequence for the internal producers. In the 
first place, falling the decrease of internal production when only one government using a two-part tariff. It's worth 
reminding that a government which maximizes incomes, encourages import firms to produce Stackelberg output 
level. And in case of maximization of domestic welfare we have competitive outcome, but with constant sharp 
reduction of internal production, and consequently by a greater dependence of a country on export.  
The modified two-part trade policy includes applying the two-part trade policy to the internal producers as 
well, that in case of oligopoly it has reduced in the subsidy (as well as for the foreign producers). In case of 
maximization of government incomes the  modified two-part trade policy is not the subsidy at any conditions, 
though the protection of the domestic producer is possible in this case. In case of a maximization of domestic 
welfare the modified policy is the subsidy.  
The results of comparison of trade policy instruments show that the modified  two-part policy is dominating. 
The two-part trade policy is considered for Bertrand competition.  
There are two countries, one home, other foreign. There is one home and one foreign firm. Let ip  - price 
of the goods firm i on the home market; Let *ip  - price of the goods firm i in the foreign market; The market 
demand function is )( pDq =  and )( *** pDq =  in the home and foreign market. Each firm incurs a cost iс   per 
unit of production ( 21 cс < ). Therefore, the profit of firm i is 
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e, e* - payment for the license to home and foreign government accordingly; t, t*- the tariff per unit of production 
imposed on home and foreign firms accordingly. 
The payoff functions of governments are defined similarly of formulas (4.24) and (4.25). 
Because of market segmentation and because of the constancy of marginal cost, we can proceed by examining just 
one national market. Then 
**
2
*
1
*
1
**
2
*
1
*
11
*
11 ),(),()( eppDtppDсp −⋅−⋅−=π ,  
),()( *2
*
1
*
22
*
22 ppDcp ⋅−=π . 
Lemma 5. In given  Bertrand model  optimal two-part policy is the positive tariff 
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 The optimal policy in given  Bertrand model  differs from optimal policy in Cournot model. So in Cournot 
model for a case of two firms optimal two-part policy always was subsidy, which with growth of number of firms 
passed in the positive tariff. In Bertrand model  for a case of two firms as optimal policy we have the positive 
tariff (not subsidy). 
Have two-part trade policy actually been used in the international trade? Have it been used in the market structures 
analyzed in the project? The answer is yes. 
There is a defined number of examples of use of such policies: 
1) Two-part tariffs (TPT) ( It is a case of two-part trade policy ),,( tez ∞= ) 
Two-part tariffs are pricing schemes that involve a fixed fee which must be paid to consume any amount of good, 
and then a variable fee based on usage. Two-part tariffs are commonly used in practice. Table TPT gives a few 
examples: 
Table TPT. 
 Fixed premium  Charge varying according to 
Telephone, gas, electricity Rental Number of units 
Polaroid camera Camera purchase Amount of film 
Amusement park Входной билет Number of rides 
Taxi Initial meter reading Distance 
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In international trade the two-part tariff is used by governments to such firms: 
the suppliers of the electric power, services of cellular connection, Internet of services, services of transport. 
2) Tariff-rate quota (TCR) ( It is a case of two-part trade policy ),,0( tqz = ) 
A tariff-rate quota is a quota for a volume of imports at a lower tariff. After the quota is reached, a higher tariff is 
applied on additional imports. Suppose a country replaces its quota of 10,000 tons with a TRQ of 10,000 tons. The 
TRQ appears to differ from the "absolute" quota. The distinction is that under an absolute quota it is legally 
impossible to import more than 10,000 tons, whereas under a TRQ, imports can exceed 10,000 tons but a higher, 
over-quota tariff is applied on the excess. In principle, a TRQ provides more market access to imports than a quota. 
In practice, however, many over-quota tariffs are prohibitively high and effectively exclude imports in excess of 
the quota. It is possible to design a TRQ so that it reproduces the trade-volume limit of the quota it replaces. 
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ's) are two-level tariffs. TRQ's were adopted during the Uruguay Round as a method for 
providing greater access to markets with high tariffs. A limited volume of imports is allowed at the lower tariff, 
and all subsequent imports are charged the higher tariff. If the demand for imports at the low tariff is greater than 
the volume allowed by the TRQ, then imports must be rationed.  
A TRQ has three components: 
- a quota that defines the maximum volume of imports charged the in-quota tariff,  
- an in-quota tariff, and  
- an over-quota tariff.  
The two-level tariff results in a stepped import supply function. Imports within the quota are charged the lower 
tariff; over-quota imports are charged the higher tariff. This results in a vertical step when the quota volume is 
filled. The figure illustrates a case in which domestic demand is sufficient to import the full quota volume at the in-
quota tariff, but the over-quota tariff is prohibitive. That is, the domestic price is below the price of imports with 
the over-quota tariff, thus there is no incentive to import beyond the quota. Were domestic demand to increase, it 
might become profitable to import at the over-quota tariff. This opportunity would not be possible with a standard, 
absolute quota. 
TRQ administration involves distributing the rights to import at the in-quota tariff. Whoever obtains such rights 
can make a risk-free profit of the difference between the domestic price, and the world price inclusive of the in-
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quota tariff. The area labeled ‘RENT' in the figure represents the value of these profitable opportunities. Rents 
indicate that the demand to trade within the quota is greater than the supply of quota; thus the necessity to ration or 
administer the TRQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which countries have TRQ's? Of the 137 WTO members, 37 countries permanently use TRQ’s. The 
countries with the greatest number of TRQ's are concentrated among relatively wealthy economies with 
historically protectionist agricultural policies. In addition, several Central and Eastern European countries have 
adopted TRQ's to ease the transition of their agricultural sectors into a market-oriented economy.  Tariff quota 
administration is fundamentally a rationing problem. The issue for TRQ administration is to determine whether 
some ways of rationing are better than others.  
The following example is considered: “Russia Threatens Tariff and Quota Hikes” that can illustrate the 
theoretical part of study: 
Meat and poultry exporters to Russia face heavy tariffs next year if plans by the Russian Agriculture 
Ministry come in to force. The ministry has said it intends to raise import tariffs as a protective measure and 
impose import quotas on beef, pork and poultry. The ministry said the measures are aimed to protect the domestic 
industry from dumping of cheap imports. The tariffs come as part of the Russian retaliation to grain quotas that 
have been imposed by the EU and which are expected to effect exports from Russia.  
“RENT” 
Over- 
quota 
tariff 
In-quota tariff 
Domestic price 
World price+ 
in-quota tariff 
World price 
World price + 
Over-quota tariff 
Quota 
Import volume 
Tariff-rate quota 
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It is believed that the new tariff on pork will be set at 80 per cent compared to the present 15 per cent. On 
beef the tariff will rise from 15 per cent to 25 per cent and on poultry from 25 per cent to 35 per cent. The quotas 
that are being proposed would limit imports of pork to Russia to 340,000 tones, beef 420,000 tones and poultry 
750,000 tones.  
Last year Russia imported 348,000 tones of pork of which 315,000 tones came from the EU, mainly from Denmark 
with some from Germany, France and the Netherlands, and 27,600 tones coming from the US. Russia's pork 
imports amounted to a quarter of the country's own output Russia also imported 475,000 tones of beef and 1.39 
million tones of poultry meat.  
Below in the table 7.1 the comparative analysis on the poultry meat for 2003 and optimum two-part policy with 
results of the simple tariff of 2001 is given.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tab 7.1 
Poultry meat      
  
Simple tariff 
(2001) 
Tariff+quota 
(2003)   
Tariff+quota 
(optimal)   
  t=25% t=35%,q=0,75   t=35%,q=1,030   
Home output 1,240 1,560 25,8% 1,420 14,5% 
Import 1,390 0,750 -46,0% 1,030 -25,9% 
Government 
revenues 0,264 0,207 -21,6% 0,281 6,4% 
Payoff of home 
firm  0,140 0,222 58,6% 0,183 30,7% 
Payoff of foreign 0,176 0,052 -70,5% 0,063 -64,2% 
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firm  
Price 0,760 0,789 3,8% 0,777 2,2% 
 
 
 
     
      
      
      
      
      
The mentioned above practical examples of strategic trade policies speak about actual of the 
theoretical results, obtained in the project. 
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9. Appendices. The proofs of the theorems. 
Proof  of Lemma 4.1.: 
The solution to the first order conditions (4.5), (4.6) will yield q1 and v1 as functions of tariffs t 
and t*. The comparative static effects 
t
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∂
∂  can be obtained by totally differentiating first 
order conditions (4.7) with respect to q1, v1, t, t* as follows. 
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These equations can be solved using Cramer’s rule: 
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Proof of Corollary 4.1.: 
   Let )(~ 11 vq  and )(~ 11 qv  be domestic firm’s best response and foreign firm’s best response. 
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Tab.4.1 
 Home government  
 )0,,0( ∞=z  
free trade 
),,( tvez =  
two-part trade 
Fo
re
ig
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
)0,,0(* ∞=z  
free trade 
G=0, π=(a-2c*+c)2/9b; 
G*=0, π*=(a-2c+c*)2/9b; 
q=(a-2c+c*)/3b;q*=(a-2c*+c)/3b; 
t=0;t*=0;e=0;e*=0; 
G=(a-2c+c*)2/8b, π=0; 
G*=0, π*=(a-3c*+2c)2/16b; 
q=(a-2c+c*)/2b;q*=(a-3c*+2c)/4b; 
t=-(a-2c+c*)/4,t*=0;e=(a-2c+c*)2/4b;e*=0; 
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*),*,(* tqez =
two-part 
G=0, π=(a-3c+2c*)2/16b; 
G*=(a-2c*+c)2/8b, π*=0; 
q=(a-3c+2c*)/4b; q*=(a-2c*+c)/2b; 
t=0; t*=-(a-2c*+c)/4b; 
 e=0; e*=(a-2c*+c)2/4b; 
G=2(a-3c+2c*)2/25b, π=0; 
G*=2(a-3c*+2c)2/25b, π*=0; 
q=2(a-3c*+2c)/5b, q*=2(a-3c+2c*)/5b; 
t=-(a-3c+2c*)/5,t*=-(a-3c*+2c)/5;    
e=4(a-3c*+2c)2/25b;e*=4(a-3c+2c*)2/25b; 
Example 4.3. (homogeneous case) Two markets two governments ((in case of G), and three 
cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N * =1); 2) three firms (N=1, N * =2); 3) four firms (N=1, N *=3); 4) many 
firms (N=1, N *=20). Inverse functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; 
p*(Q*)=1-Q*; the costs functions of home and foreign firms: C(q) =cq2/2; C*(q) =cq2/2. Outcomes of 
optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are illustrated on 
the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
income of  home government 
 
 
income of  foreign government 
 
optimal two-part tariff of home government  optimal two-part tariff of foreign government 
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Example 4.4. Two markets two governments ((in case of G), and three cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N * 
=1); 2) three firms (N=2, N * =2); 3) four firms (N=3, N *=3); 4) many firms (N=20, N *=20). Inverse 
functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*)=1-Q*; the costs functions of 
home and foreign firms: C(q) =cq2/2; C*(q) =cq2/2.  
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Example 4.5. Two markets, two governments, two firms. All parameters are similar to an Example 4.2 
except for elimination с=0,5 (for simplification of the comparative analysis). The optimum policies for 
different combinations of choices of governments are given in Tab. 4.3. 
 
                                                  Home government                                     Tab. 4.3.    
 )0,,0( ∞=z  
free trade 
),,0( tz ∞=  
simple tariff 
),,( tvez =  
two-part trade 
Fo
re
ig
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
)0,,0(* ∞=z  
free trade 
G=0; π=0,1875; 
G*=0; π*=0,1875; 
q=0,25; q*=0,25; 
v=0,25; v*=0,25; 
t=0; e=0; 
t*=0; e*=0; 
G=0,03; π=0,1389; 
G*=0; π*=0,2139; 
q=0,2850; q*=0,1250; 
v=0,2250; v*=0,3050; 
t=0; e=0; 
t*=0,2400; e*=0; 
G=0,1264; π=0,1665; 
G*=0; π*=0,0548; 
q=0,1862;q*=0,2790; 
v=0,3951;v*=0,2094; 
t=-0,2785;e=0,2364; 
t*=0;e*=0; 
 
optimal two-part tariff of home government &  
optimal two-part tariff of foreign government  income of home government & income of 
foreign government 
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*),,0(* tz ∞=  
simple tariff 
G=0; π=0,2139; 
G*=0,03; π*=0,1389; 
q=0,2250;q*=0,3050; 
v=0,2850;v*=0,1250; 
t=0,2400;e=0; 
t*=0;e*=0; 
G=0,0248; π=0,1726; 
G*=0,0248;π*=0,1726; 
q=0,3318;q*=0,1136; 
v=0,3318;v*=0,1136; 
t=0,2182;e=0; 
t*=0,2182;e*=0; 
G=0,1160; π=0,4011; 
G*=0,0380;π*=0,5913; 
q=0,2205;q*=0,1407; 
v=0,3784;v*=0,2681; 
t=-0,3005;e=0,2297 
t*=0,2701;e*=0; 
 
*),*,(* tqez =
 two-part trade 
G=0; π=0,0548 
G*=0,1264;π*=0,1665; 
q=0,3951;q*=0,2094; 
v=0,1862;v*=0,2790; 
t=0;e=0; 
t*=-0,2785;e*=0,2364; 
G=0,0380; π=0,5913; 
G*=0,1160; π*=0,4011; 
q=0,3784;q*=0,2681; 
v=0,2205;v*=0,1407; 
t=0,2701;e=0,2297; 
t*=-0,3005;e*=0; 
G=0,1368; π=0,0294; 
G*=0,1368; π*=0,0294; 
q=0,1534;q*=0,4110; 
v=0,4110;v*=0,1534; 
t=-0,2575;e=0,2426; 
t*=-0,2575;e*=0,2426; 
The considered example is also new, as it is introduced for the first time for the two-part trade 
policy in case of two countries and two markets, though is compared to known results for a case of free 
trade and simple tariff. The references are not specified as the given outcomes were obtained by the 
author, as a special case of the two-part trade policy. From the given example it is visible, that the 
optimum two-part trade policy is the subsidy at the positive payment for the license.  
From the given example it is visible, that an optimum two-part trade policy is the subsidy at the 
positive payment for the license.  
If the two-part trade policy is applied only by one government, the optimum subsidy of exterior 
firm moves it on the leading Stakelberg output level, and the interior firm is moved to the level of the 
follower. Thus the income of government at the two-part policy is the largest.  
  If the two-part policy is applied by both governments (at a maximization Gk), their optimum 
policy still will be the subsidy at the positive tariff. However in case of maximization of welfare (Gk +πk) 
the game at a level of governments looks like a prisoners` dilemma made, as both producing countries are 
worse off at the strategic subsidy equilibrium than they would be under free trade, but each has a 
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unilateral incentive to intervene. Thus this deviation goes not on the simple tariff, and on the two-part 
trade policy, which obviously dominates above the simple tariff. 
Let's consider for an example 4.5, whether the optimum two-part trade policy of the Pareto-
optimal with respect to the policies of each government (G+G *), i.e. the case when between 
governments is present collusion. In this case we have the following first-best outcome: 
t=t*=-0.3385<0, which rather differs from the individually two-part tariffs t=t*=-0.2575<0 
(G=G*=0.1368) . In case when between governments is present collusion G=G*=0.1385>0.1368, 
q=0.1231,q*=0.4615; v=0.1231,v*=0.4615;e= e*=0.2947. Here, the game also has the prisoners' 
dilemma flavor in the sense that collusion between the two governments would have resulted in greater 
revenue for each (assuming equal division of total revenue) that individually rational policies. 
Example 4.6. Two markets two governments ((in case of W), and three cases: 1) two firms (N=1, 
N * =1); 2) three firms (N=1, N * =2); 3) four firms (N=1, N *=3); 4) many firms (N=1, N *=20).. 
Inverse functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*)=1-Q*; the costs 
functions of home and foreign firms: C(q) =cq2/2; C*(q) =cq2/2.  
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
domestic welfare of  a foreign country domestic welfare of a home country 
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Example 4.7. Two markets two governments ((in case of W), and three cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N * 
=1); 2) three firms (N=2, N * =2); 3) four firms (N=3, N *=3) ; 4) many firms (N=20, N *=20).. Inverse 
functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*)=1-Q*; the costs functions of 
home and foreign firms: C(q) =cq2/2; C*(q) =cq2/2.  
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Example 4.8. (inhomogeneous case) Two markets, two governments (in case of G), and three 
cases::1) two firms (N=1, N*=1); ) three firms (N=1, N=2); 3) four firms (N=1, N*=3); 4) many firms 
(N=1, N*=20). Inverse functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*) = 1-Q*; 
the costs functions of  home and foreign firms:  Ci(q)= ci q2/2 ,  i=1..N; Cj*(q) = *jc q
2/2 , j=1..N* ,  
 
optimal two-part tariff of home government &  
optimal two-part tariff of foreign government 
 
 
domestic welfare of a home country &  
domestic welfare of  a foreign country 
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2c3.02.01.0 *20
*
3
*
2
*
11 +<+=<+=<+=≤= cccccccc . Here increase of parameter c reduces in a 
decrease of a heterogeneity of costs functions. 
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in an inhomogeneous case in work Fuerst and Kim was considered only one numerical example, for 
the purposes of comparison with our model we shall conduct more account of models Fuerst and Kim for 
the greater number of cases (for different N, N *, iC  and  
*
jC ). 
Example 4.9. (inhomogeneous case, Fuerst and Kim) One market, one government (in case of G), and 
three cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N*=1); 2) three firms (N=1, N=2); 3) four firms (N=1, N*=3). Inverse 
 
income of home government 
income of foreign government 
 
optimal two-part tariff of home government
 
optimal two-part tarifff of foreign government
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functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*) = 1-Q*; the costs functions of 
home and foreign firms:  Ci(q)= ci q2/2,  i=1..N; Cj*(q) = *jc q
2/2 , j=1..N* ,  
931 *3
*
2
*
11 +=<+=<+=≤= cccccccc . Here increase of parameter c reduces in a decrease of a 
heterogeneity of costs functions. 
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0,1.. 15 were simulated in Maple 7 and 
are illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 4.10. (inhomogeneous case) Two markets, two governments (in case of W), and three 
cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N*=1); 2) three firms (N=1, N=2); 3) four firms (N=1, N*=3). Inverse 
functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*) = 1-Q*; the costs functions of  
home and foreign firms:  Ci(q)= ci q2/2 ,  i=1..N; Cj*(q) = *jc q
2/2 , j=1..N* , 
35,15,0 *3
*
2
*
11 +=<+=<+=≤= cccccccc . Here increase of parameter c reduces in a decrease of a 
heterogeneity of costs functions. 
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0,2.. 8 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
 
 
 
income of home government optimal two-part tariff of home government 
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As in an inhomogeneous case in work Fuerst and Kim was considered only one numerical example, for 
the purposes of comparison with our model we shall conduct more account of models Fuerst and Kim for 
the greater number of cases (for different N, N *, iC  and  
*
jC ). 
Example 4.11. (inhomogeneous case, Fuerst and Kim) One market, one government (in case of 
W), and three cases: 1) two firms (N=1, N*=1); 2) three firms (N=1, N=2); 3) four firms (N=1, N*=3). 
Inverse functions of demand in the home and foreign market: p(Q)=1-Q; p*(Q*) = 1-Q*; the costs 
functions of  home and foreign firms:  Ci(q)= ci q2/2 ,  i=1..N; Cj*(q) = *jc q
2/2 , j=1..N* ,  
931 *3
*
2
*
11 +=<+=<+=≤= cccccccc . Here increase of parameter c reduces in a decrease of a 
heterogeneity of costs functions. 
Outcomes of optimum policy for various values of parameter c=0,1.. 4 were simulated in Maple 7 and are 
illustrated on the graphs: 
 
  
optimal two-part tariff of home government  
 
 
optimal two-part tariff of foreign government 
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Table 6.1 
 
0
~z  1~z  2~z  3~z  4~z  5~z  
0z
 
W=0.36,W*=0.36 
t  = -----, t1  = ---- 
t*= -----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.30,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.30,q2*=0.30 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.18,π2=0.18 
p=0.40,p*=0.40 
W=0.36,W*=0.34 
t  = -----, t1  = ---- 
t*= -----, t*1=0.23 
q1=0.38,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.30 
e   = ---,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.23, π2=0.11 
p =0.40,p*=0.48 
W=0.36,W*=0.34 
t  = ----, t1  = ---- 
t*= 0.23, t*1=---- 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.38,q2*=0.30 
e= ----,e*= ---- 
π1=0.13, π2=0.17 
p= 0.59,p*=0.66 
W=0.36,W*=0.23 
t =----,t1=----- 
t*= 0.45,t*1=0.45 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.30 
e =----,e*=---- 
π1=0.11, π2=0.11 
p =0.40,p*=0.70 
W=0.41,W*=0.36 
t  = ----, t1  = ----- 
t*= -0.81, t*1= --- 
q1=0.81,q1*=0.30 
q2 = 0, q2*=0.30 
e   = ---,e*=0.81 
π1=0.09, π2=0.09 
p=0.40,p*=0.10 
W=0.36,W*=0.41 
t=---,t1 =---- 
t*=-0.23,t1*=-0.68  
q1=0.23,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.68,q2*=0.30 
e =--- ,e*=0.05 
π1=0.09, π2=0.546 
p =0.40,p*=0.10 
1z
 
W=0.34,W*=0.36 
t = ----, t1  = 0.23 
t*= -----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.38,q2*=0.30 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1 =0.11, π2=0.23 
p=0.48,p*=0.40 
W=0.34,W=0.34 
t  = ---, t1  = 0.23 
t*= ----, t*1= 0.23 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.38,q2*=0.15 
e  = ---,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.16 
p=0.48, p*=0.48 
W=0.34,W*=0.34 
t  = -----,t1=0.23 
t*=0.23, t*1= --- 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.38,q2*=0.38 
e   = ---,e*=----- 
π1=0.04,π2=0.28 
p =0.48,p*=0.48 
W=0.34,W*=0.23 
t=----, t1=0.23 
t*=0.45,t*1=0.45 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.38 
e=--,e*= ---- 
π1=0.04, π2=0.16 
p =0.48,p*=0.70 
W=0.34,W*=0.41 
t=0.23, t1= ---- 
t*=-0.81, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.81,q1*=0.15 
q2=0,   q2*=0.38 
e = ---,e*= 0.81 
π1=0.02, π2=0.14 
p =0.48,p*=0.10 
W=0.34,W*=0.41  
t  = -----,t1 =0.23  
t*=-0.23, t*1=-0.68  
q1 =0.23,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.68,q2*=0.38 
e =----,e*=0.05 
π1=0.02, π2=0.596 
p=0.48,p*=0.10 
2z
 
W=0.34,W*=0.36 
t  = 0.23, t1  = ---- 
t*= ----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.38,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.30 
e   = ----,e*  = --- 
π1=0.17,π2=0.13 
p =0.66,p*=0.59 
W=0.34,W*=0.34 
t =0.23,t1= ---- 
t*= ----,t*1=0.23 
q1=0.38,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.15 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.28, π2=0.04 
p=0.48,p*=0.48 
W=0.34,W*=0.34 
t  = 0.23, t1  = ---- 
t*= 0.23, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.38,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.38 
e = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.16 
p =0.48,p*=0.48 
W=0.34,W*=0.23 
t =0.23, t1 =----- 
t*=0.45,t*1=0.45 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.15 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.04 
p =0.48,p*=0.70 
W=0.34,W*=0.41 
t=0.23, t1= ---- 
t*=-0.81,t*1= --- 
q1=0.81,q1*=0.38 
q2=0,  q2* = 0.15 
e= ---, e*= 0.81 
π1=0.14, π2=0.02 
p =0.48,p*=0.10 
W=0.34,W*=0.41 
t =0.23,t1 =---- 
t*=-0.23,t*1=-0.68  
q1 =0.23,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.68,q2*=0.15 
e =----,e*=0.05 
π1=0.14,π2=0.478 
p=0.48,p*=0.10 
3z
 
W=0.23,W*=0.36 
t =0.45, t1=0.45 
t*= ---, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.30 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.11,π2=0.11 
p =0.70,p*=0.40 
W=0.23,W*=0.34 
t =0.45, t1 =0.45 
t*= ---, t*1= 0.23 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.15 
e= ---,e*=----- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.04 
p=0.70,p*=0.48 
W=0.23,W*=0.34 
t =0.45,t1 =0.45 
t*=0.23, t*1= ----- 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.38 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.04,π2=0.16 
p=0.70,p*=0.48 
W=0.23,W*=0.23 
t =0.45,t1=0.45 
t*=0.45, t*1=0.45 
q1=0.15,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.15,q2*=0.15 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.04,π2=0.04 
p=0.70,p*=0.70 
W=0.23,W*=0.41 
t =0.45, t1=0.45 
t*= -0.81,t*1=---- 
q1=0.81,q1*=0.15 
q2=0,   q2*=0.15 
e = ----, e*= 0.81 
π1=0.02, π2=0.02 
p=0.70,p*=0.10 
W=0.135,W*=0.41 
t=0.45,t1 =0.45  
t*= -0.23,t*1=-0.68  
q1 =0.23,q1* =0.15 
q2=0.68,q2* =0.15 
e= ---,e*= 0.05 
π1=0.23, π2=0.478 
p=0.70,p*=0.10 
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4z
 
W=0.41,W*=0.36 
t  = -0.81, t1  = --- 
t*= ----, t*1= ---- 
q1 =0, q1*=0.30 
q2=0.81,q2*=0.30 
e =0.81,e*= ---- 
π1=0.09,π2=0.09 
p =0.10,p*=0.40 
W=0.41,W*=0.34 
t=-0.81, t1 =---- 
t*=0.23, t*1=--- 
q1=0,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.81,q2*=0.15 
e =0.81,e*=---- 
π1=0.14, π2=0.02 
p =0.10,p*=0.48 
W=0.41,W*=0.34 
t=-0.81,t1 =--- 
t*=0.23,t*1=---- 
q1=0,   q1*=0.15 
q2=0.81,q2*=0.38 
e =0.81,e*= --- 
π1=0.02, π2=0.14 
p =0.10,p*=0.48 
W=0.41,W*=0.23 
t=-0.81,t1=---- 
t*=0.45,t*1= 0.45 
q1=0,  q1* =0.15 
q2=0.81,q2*=0.15 
e =0.81,e*=---- 
π1=0.02, π2=0.02 
p=0.10,p*=0.70 
W=0.41,W*=0.41 
t=-0.90, t1=---- 
t*=-0.90,t*1=--- 
q1= 0,q1* =0.9 
q2=0.9,q2* =0 
e =0.81,e*=0.81 
π1=0, π2=0 
p=0.10,p*=0.10 
W=0.41,W*=0.41 
t  = -0.9,t1 = ---- 
t*=-0.23,t*1=-0.68 
q1 =0.23,q1* =0 
q2=0.68,q2*=0.9 
e =0.81,e*=0.05 
π1=0, π2=0.45 
p=0.10,p*=0.10 
5z
 
W=0.41,W*=0.36 
t =-0.23,t1=-0.68 
t*= ---,  t*1=---  
q1=0.68,q1*=0.30 
q2=0.23,q2*=0.30 
e = 0.05,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.546,π2=0.09 
p= 0.10,p*=0.40 
W=0.41,W*=0.34 
t =-0.23,t1 =-0.68 
t*=-----,t*1=0.23  
q1=0.68,q1*=0.38 
q2=0.23,q2*=0.15 
e =0.05,e*=---- 
π1=0.596, 1π =0.02 
p=0.10,p* =0.48 
W=0.41,W*=0.34 
t=-0.23,t1 =-0.68 
t*=0.23,t*1=----  
q1=0.68,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.23,q2*=0.38 
e =0.05,e*= ---- 
π1=0.478,π2=0.141 
p =0.10,p*=0.48 
W=0.41,W*=0.14 
t=-0.23,t1=-0.68 
t*=0.45,t*1=0.45  
q1=0.68,q1*=0.15 
q2=0.23,q2*=0.15 
e =0.05,e*= --- 
π1=0.478,π2=0.23 
p =0.10,p*=0.70 
W=0.41,W*=0.41 
t=-0.23,t1=-0.68 
t*=-0.9,t*1=---- 
q1 =0.68,q1*=0.9 
q2=0.23,q2*=0 
e =0.05,e*=0.81 
π1=0.45, π2=0 
p=0.10,p*=0.10 
W=0.41,W*=0.41 
t=-0.23,t1 =-0.68 
t*=-0.23,t*1=-0.68 
q1 =0.68,q1*=0.23 
q2=0.23,q2*=0.68 
e =0.05,e*=0.05 
π1=0.45, π2=0.45 
p=0.10,p* =0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Табл. 6.2 
 
0
~z  1~z  2~z  3~z  4~z  5~z  
0z
 
W=0.28,W*=0.28 
t  = -----, t1  = ---- 
t*= -----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.20,q1*=0.20 
q2=0.20,q2*=0.20 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.16,π2=0.16 
p=0.60,p*=0.60 
W=0.29,W*=0.25 
t  = -----, t1  = ---- 
t*= -----, t*1=0.21 
q1=0.24,q1*=0.17 
q2=0.10,q2*=0.24 
e   = ---,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.17, π2=0.13 
p =0.59,p*=0.66 
W=0.28,W*=0.25 
t  = ----, t1  = ---- 
t*= 0.21, t*1=---- 
q1=0.10,q1*=0.24 
q2=0.24,q2*=0.17 
e= ----,e*= ---- 
π1=0.13, π2=0.17 
p= 0.59,p*=0.66 
W=0.30,W*=0.17 
t =----,t1=----- 
t*= 0.37,t*1=0.37 
q1=0.01,q1*=0.23 
q2=0.10,q2*=0.23 
e =----,e*=---- 
π1=0.11, π2=0.11 
p =0.55,p*=0.80 
W=0.27,W*=0.30 
t  = ----, t1  = ----- 
t*= -0.32, t*1= --- 
q1=0.14,q1*=0.24 
q2=0.35, q2*=0.14 
e   = ---,e*=0.23 
π1=0.15, π2=0.03 
p=0.51,p*=0.62 
W=0.25,W*=0.33 
t=---,t1 =---- 
t*=-0.50,t1*=-0.50  
q1=0.33,q1*=0.17 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.17 
e =--- ,e*=0.22 
π1=0.04, π2=0.26 
p =0.66,p*=0.33 
1z
 
W=0.25,W*=0.29 
t = ----, t1  = 0.21 
t*= -----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.10,q1*=0.24 
q2=0.24,q2*=0.17 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1 =0.13, π2=0.17 
p=0.66,p*=0.59 
W=0.26,W=0.26 
t  = ---, t1  = 0.19 
t*= ----, t*1= 0.19 
q1=0.09,q1*=0.26 
q2=0.28,q2*=0.09 
e  = ---,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.15, π2=0.15 
p=0.64, p*=0.64 
W=0.25,W*=0.25 
t  = -----,t1=0.27 
t*=0.27, t*1= --- 
q1=0.13,q1*=0.13 
q2=0.22,q2*=0.22 
e   = ---,e*=----- 
π1=0.06,π2=0.19 
p =0.65,p*=0.65 
W=0.27,W*=0.18 
t=----, t1=0.25 
t*=0.42,t*1=0.36 
q1=0.13,q1*=0.12 
q2=0.08,q2*=0.27 
e=--,e*= ---- 
π1=0.06, π2=0.14 
p =0.62,p*=0.79 
W=0.24,W*=0.29 
t=0.16, t1= ---- 
t*=-0.26, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.35,q1*=0.07 
q2=0.13,q2*=0.27 
e = ---,e*= 0.21 
π1=0.01, π2=0.16 
p =0.66,p*=0.52 
W=0.22,W*=0.33  
t  = -----,t1 =0.23  
t*=-0.43, t*1=-0.50  
q1 =0.33,q1*=0.09 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.19 
e =----,e*=0.28 
π1=0.01, π2=0.29 
p=0.72,p*=0.33 
2z
 
W=0.25,W*=0.29 
t  = 0.21, t1  = ---- 
t*= ----, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.24,q1*=0.17 
q2=0.10,q2*=0.24 
e   = ----,e*  = --- 
π1=0.17,π2=0.13 
p =0.66,p*=0.59 
W=0.25,W*=0.25 
t =0.27,t1= ---- 
t*= ----,t*1=0.27 
q1=0.22,q1*=0.22 
q2=0.13,q2*=0.13 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.19, π2=0.06 
p=0.65,p*=0.65 
W=0.25,W*=0.25 
t  = 0.19, t1  = ---- 
t*= 0.19, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.28,q1*=0.09 
q2=0.09,q2*=0.28 
e = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.16 
p =0.48,p*=0.48 
W=0.27,W*=0.18 
t =0.25, t1 =----- 
t*=0.36,t*1=0.42 
q1=0.08,q1*=0.27 
q2=0.13,q2*=0.12 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.14, π2=0.06 
p =0.62,p*=0.79 
W=0.23,W*=0.31 
t=0.27, t1= ---- 
t*=-0.39,t*1= --- 
q1=0.34,q1*=0.18 
q2=0.18,q2*=0.13 
e= ---, e*= 0.24 
π1=0.05, π2=0.09 
p =0.70,p*=0.48 
W=0.22,W*=0.33 
t =0.20,t1 =---- 
t*=-0.52,t*1=-0.43  
q1 =0.33,q1*=0.19 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.09 
e =----,e*=0.23 
π1=0.05,π2=0.21 
p=0.71,p*=0.33 
3z
 
W=0.17,W*=0.30 
t =0.37, t1=0.37 
t*= ---, t*1= ---- 
q1=0.10,q1*=0.23 
q2=0.01,q2*=0.23 
e   = ---,e*  = --- 
π1=0.11,π2=0.11 
W=0.18,W*=0.27 
t =0.42, t1 =0.36 
t*= ---, t*1= 0.25 
q1=0.08,q1*=0.27 
q2=0.13,q2*=0.12 
e= ---,e*=----- 
π1=0.14, π2=0.06 
W=0.18,W*=0.27 
t =0.36,t1 =0.42 
t*=0.25, t*1= ----- 
q1=0.13,q1*=0.12 
q2=0.08,q2*=0.27 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.06,π2=0.14 
W=0.19,W*=0.19 
t =0.43,t1=0.43 
t*=0.43, t*1=0.43 
q1=0.11,q1*=0.11 
q2=0.11,q2*=0.11 
e = ---,e*= ---- 
π1=0.05,π2=0.05 
W=0.16,W*=0.31 
t =0.39, t1=0.32 
t*= -0.29,t*1=---- 
q1=0.35,q1*=0.07 
q2=0.18,q2*=0.12 
e = ----, e*= 0.21 
π1=0.01, π2=0.09 
W=0.15,W*=0.33 
t=0.32,t1 =0.32  
t*= -0.42,t*1=-0.42  
q1 =0.33,q1* =0.09 
q2=0.33,q2* =0.09 
e= ---,e*= 0.19 
π1=0.01, π2=0.21 
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p =0.80,p*=0.55 p=0.79,p*=0.62 p=0.79,p*=0.62 p=0.77,p*=0.77 p=0.81,p*=0.47 p=0.83,p*=0.33 
4z
 
W=0.30,W*=0.27 
t  = -0.32, t1  = --- 
t*= ----, t*1= ---- 
q1 =0.14, q1*=0.24 
q2=0.35,q2*=0.14 
e =0.23,e*= ---- 
π1=0.15,π2=0.03 
p =0.51,p*=0.62 
W=0.29,W*=0.24 
t=-0.26, t1 =---- 
t*=0.16, t*1=--- 
q1=0.13,q1*=0.27 
q2=0.35,q2*=0.07 
e =0.21,e*=---- 
π1=0.16, π2=0.01 
p =0.52,p*=0.66 
W=0.31,W*=0.23 
t=-0.39,t1 =--- 
t*=0.27,t*1=---- 
q1=0.18, q1*=0.13 
q2=0.34,q2*=0.18 
e =0.24,e*= --- 
π1=0.09, π2=0.05 
p =0.48,p*=0.70 
W=0.31,W*=0.16 
t=-0.29,t1=---- 
t*=0.39,t*1= 0.32 
q1=0.18,  q1* =0.12 
q2=0.35,q2*=0.07 
e =0.21,e*=---- 
π1=0.09, π2=0.01 
p=0.47,p*=0.81 
W=0.282,W*=0.282 
t=-0.26, t1=---- 
t*=-0.26,t*1=--- 
q1= 0.10,q1* =0.35 
q2=0.35,q2* =0.10 
e =0.22,e*=0.22 
π1=0.01, π2=0.01 
p=0.55,p*=0.55 
W=0.29,W*=0.33 
t  = -0.50,t1 = ---- 
t*=-0.44,t*1=-0.69 
q1 =0.33,q1* =0.10 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.35 
e =0.31,e*=0.20 
π1=0.02, π2=0.17 
p=0.54,p*=0.33 
5z
 
W=0.33,W*=0.25 
t =-0.50,t1=-0.50 
t*= ---,  t*1=---  
q1=0.33,q1*=0.17 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.17 
e = 0.22,e*  = ---- 
π1=0.26,π2=0.04 
p= 0.33,p*=0.66 
W=0.33,W*=0.22 
t =-0.43,t1 =-0.52 
t*=-----,t*1=-0.20  
q1=0.33,q1*=0.19 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.09 
e =0.28,e*=---- 
π1=0.29, 1π =0.01 
p=0.33,p* =0.72 
W=0.33,W*=0.22 
t=-0.52,t1 =-0.43 
t*=0.20,t*1=----  
q1=0.33,q1*=0.09 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.19 
e =0.23,e*= ---- 
π1=0.21,π2=0.05 
p =0.33,p*=0.71 
W=0.33,W*=0.15 
t=-0.42,t1=-0.42 
t*=0.32,t*1=0.32  
q1=0.33,q1*=0.09 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.09 
e =0.19,e*= --- 
π1=0.21,π2=0.01 
p =0.33,p*=0.83 
W=0.33,W*=0.29 
t=-0.44,t1=-0.69 
t*=-0.50,t*1=---- 
q1 =0.33,q1*=0.35 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.10 
e =0.20,e*=0.31 
π1=0.17, π2=0.02 
p=0.33,p*=0.54 
W=0.33,W*=0.33 
t=-0.67,t1 =-0.67 
t*=-0.67,t*1=-0.67 
q1 =0.33,q1*=0.33 
q2=0.33,q2*=0.33 
e =0.28,e*=0.28 
π1=0.17, π2=0.17 
p=0.33,p* =0.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof  of Theorem 4.1.:   
I) Taking into account the imposing of quota  by 1q  and 1v  we get that ],0[],,0[ 11 vvqq ∈∈ . Thus 
maximization 1π  by 1q  can be considered on a compact set ],0[3 qX = , and maximization *1π  by 1v  - 
on a compact set ],0[4 vX = . 
II) By the data 1),2) functions ),( 111 vqπ and ),( 11*1 vqπ  are continuous.  
III) As according to the conditions 1) - 3) the theorems guarantee the following conditions: 
0"'2"            ,0"'2" *12
1
*
1
2
12
1
1
2
<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂ cpvp
v
cpqp
q
ππ         (4.13) 
The conditions (4.13) guarantee a concavity of functions ),( 111 vqπ and ),( 11*1 vqπ .  
IV) Thus from I), II) and III) on the basis of the theorem of Nash it follows that there is an Curnout 
equilibrium on the second step of the game ),(),,( *01
*0
1 ttvttq . 
 Now we shall return to the first step of the game and we shall consider the game between 
governments. Let's show that the conditions of the theorem guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium 
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on the first step as well, an consequently the existence of the perfect subgame Nash equilibrium, which 
will make the optimum two-part trade policy.  
V) In the beginning we shall show that the problem of maximization )(1 xf  by t can be considered on a 
segment (compact set) X1= ],[ вн tt  and the problem of maximization )(2 xf  by t* can be considered on a 
segment (compact set) X2= ],[ ** вн tt . This fact immediately comes from continuity and limitation of 
functions ),(),,( *1
*
1 ttvttq .  
VI) As 2)( CQp ∈  ; 2)( Cqc ∈  and 2* )( Cvc ∈ , then functions  )),((),(),( *1*1*1 ttqcttqpttf −⋅= ;  
)),((),(),( *1
**
1
*
2 ttvcttvpttf −⋅=  are continuous.  
VII) Further we shall prove concavity of functions ),( *1 ttf  and ),(
*
2 ttf  by t и t* accordingly.  
We differentiate function ),( *1 ttf  twice by  t : 
2
1
1
11
1
2
1
12
*
1
2
")'"(2)'2"(),( 


∂
∂⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅+⋅+


∂
∂⋅′′−+⋅=∂
∂
t
vqp
t
v
t
qpqp
t
qcpqp
t
ttf        (4.14) 
We shall use the Lemma 4.1. and Corollary 4.1.  And then if 0"<p   then the estimation is fair 
0)")1('2)1("(),(
2
12
12
*
1
2
<


∂
∂⋅−+⋅++⋅⋅=∂
∂
t
qcpvp
t
ttf αα  
if 0"≥p   then the estimation is fair 
0)1()1)((
)")1('2)1("(),(
2
12
12
*
1
2
<′′−+′++′+′′≤
≤


∂
∂⋅−+⋅++⋅⋅=∂
∂
cppqp
t
qcpvp
t
ttf
αα
αα  
Thus function ),( *1 ttf  is concave by t. Similarly we obtain a concavity ),(
*
2 ttf  by t*. 
VIII) So, from  V), VI) and VII) On the basis of the Nash theorem it follows that there is Nash 
equilibrium on the first step of the game ( )0*0 , tt . From IV) and VIII) it follows that in the game Г1 there 
exists perfect subgame Nash equilibrium: ),((),,((),,,(),,,( *01
*0
1
0*00*0000 ttvttqtvetqeX = ,  where  
),()),((),(),(),(( 0*001
00*00
1
0*00
1
0*0
1
0*00
1
0* ttqtttqcttqttvttqpe ⋅−−⋅+= , 
),()),((),()),(),(( 0*001
00*00
1
*0*00
1
0*00
1
*000
1
0 ttvtttvcttvttvttqpe ⋅−−⋅+= , 
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),( 0*001
0 ttvv = ,   ),( 0*0010 ttqq = . Proved. 
Proof of Corollary 4.2.: 
As the existence of the optimum policy is proved in the theorem now it is possible to return to a problem 
of its searching.   Differentiating functions ),( *1 ttf  by t ,  we get: 
t
vqp
t
qcpqp
t
ttf
∂
∂⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅−+⋅=∂
∂ 1
1
1
1
*
1 ')''(),( ;  . 
From conditions (4.7) we have cpqpt ′−+= 1'   then 
t
vqp
t
qt
t
ttf
∂
∂⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅=∂
∂ 1
1
1
*
1 '),( ;                    (4.15) 
From (4.15), Lemma 4.1. condition 2) Theorem 4.1. we get that  
0
),(
0
*
1 <∂
∂
=tt
ttf
;                      (4.16) 
Similarly, 
0
),(
0
*
*
2
*
<∂
∂
=tt
ttf
;                     (4.17) 
The conditions (4.16) and (4.17) imply that the optimum two-part tariff is a subsidy. Thus the optimum 
payment for the license is equal to flowing sales proceeds of a internal firm:  0e ,   0*e  
Proof of Lemma 4.2.: 
 Because of homogeneity and symmetry, the N – models of home firms are identical, as well as N* 
of foreign firms. That’s why total sales in the two countries equal to Q and Q*. 
1
*
1 vNqNQ ⋅+⋅=   (4.19)                     *1**1 vNqNQ ⋅+⋅=   (4.20) 
From the first-order conditions in the Coumot model for home and foreign firms we have the 
followingconditions: 
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








=−+⋅=∂
∂
=−−+⋅=∂
∂
=−−+⋅=∂
∂
=−+⋅=∂
∂
0'
0''
0''
0''
***
1
*
*
1
*
1
*
1
1
*
1
***
1
*
*
1
1
1
1
1
cpvp
v
tcpvp
v
tcpqp
q
cpqp
q
π
π
π
π
                            (4.21) 
The second-order conditions are executed here under the following virtue of conditions 1) and 2) Lemma 
4.2, as they guarantee that 
0"'2"          0"'2"
0"                             ,0"
0"'2"            ,0"'2"
***
1
*
2*
1
*
1**
1
*
2*
1
1
*
*
11
*
1
2
*
11
1
2
*
12
1
*
1
2
12
1
1
2
<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂
<−=∂
∂<−=∂
∂
<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂<−⋅+⋅=∂
∂
cpvp
v
cpqp
q
c
vv
c
qq
cpvp
v
cpqp
q
ππ
ππ
ππ
        (4.22) 
The decision of the first-order conditions (4.21) will give *11
*
11 ,,, vvqq , as functions t and t*. This decision 
has tendency, that the firms will sell their product both on internal and external market. The comparative 
static effects ,,,,
*
1
*
111
t
v
t
q
t
v
t
q
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
*
1
*
*
1
*
*
1
*
*
1 ,,,
t
q
t
v
t
q
t
v
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂   can be obtained at total differentiating (4.21) with 
respect to t, t* and the levels of production of the firms. For the home market we have the system: 
( )
( )
( )
( )








=∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅−∂
∂⋅+⋅⋅
=∂
∂⋅−∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅+⋅⋅
=∂
∂⋅+⋅⋅+∂
∂−++⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅−
=∂
∂⋅+⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅−∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
0"')'"(")'"(
1"')'"()'"(
0)'"("')'"("
0)'"(""')'"(
*
1****
1
**1*
*
1**
1
*
*
1*
1
1*
1
*1
1
*
1**
1
**
*
1***
1
*1
1
1
*
*
11
1
t
vcppvpN
t
vc
t
qpvpN
t
vc
t
vcppvpN
t
qpvpN
t
vpqpN
t
qcppqpN
t
qc
t
vpqpN
t
qc
t
qcppqpN
⇔  
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⇔
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )








=∂
∂+∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
−+∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅
−++⋅⋅=∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
−+∂
∂+∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅
=∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅+∂
∂+∂
∂
−++⋅⋅
−⋅
=∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅+∂
∂⋅−++⋅⋅
−+∂
∂
0
"')'"(
"
"')'"(
)'"(
"')'"(
1
"')'"("')'"(
)'"(
0
"')'"(
)'"(
"')'"(
"
0
"')'"(
)'"(
"')'"(
"
*
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****
1
**
**
1
****
1
**
**
1
*
*
1
*
*
1
*
1
*
*
111
*
1
*
1
*
1
***
1
*
**
1
***
11
***
1
*
1
1
1
**
1
1
1
t
v
t
v
cppvpN
c
t
q
cppvpN
pvpN
cppvpNt
v
cppvpN
c
t
v
t
q
cppvpN
pvpN
t
v
cppqpN
pqpN
t
q
t
q
cppqpN
c
t
v
cppqpN
pqpN
t
q
cppqpN
c
t
q
(4.23
) 
We will introduce enter designations, taking into account, that according to the condition of Lemma 4.2. 
N=N*: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )








−++⋅⋅
−=−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅=
−++⋅⋅=−++⋅⋅
−=−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅=
−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅=−++⋅⋅
−=
−++⋅⋅
+⋅⋅=−++⋅⋅
−=
"')'"(
";
"')'"(
)'"(
"')'"(
1;
"')'"(
;
"')'"(
)'"(
"')'"(
)'"(;
"')'"(
"
"')'"(
)'"(;
"')'"(
"
****
1
*
*
8****
1
*
**
1
*
7
*
1
*
1
*
1
6*
1
1
5
***
1
*
**
1
*
4***
1
*3
1
1
2
1
1
cppvpN
cg
cppvpN
pvpNg
cppvpN
g
cppvpN
cg
cppvpN
pvpNg
cppqpN
pqpNg
cppqpN
cg
cppqpN
pqpNg
cppqpN
c
g
 
From conditions 1) - 4) of Lemma 4.2 it is obvious, that  
g<0; ;8,...1,10 =∀<< kgk     121 agg ≤+  ; 243 agg ≤+ ; 
365 agg ≤+ ; 487 agg ≤+ , 4,..,1,10 =<< iai                                   (4.24) 
In new designations the determinant of a matrix of the left part of the system (4.23) : 
)()()(1
10
10
01
01
),,,,,,,(
754286318541763252317461
87
65
43
21
87654321
gggggggggggggggggggggggg
gg
gg
gg
gg
ggggggggD
+++−+++−=
==
 
We’ll prove that kgggggggggD ∀> ,0),,,,,,,( 87654321 . In the beginning we shall show that the 
determinant can obtain the extreme value only on the border. It is really so because of continuity 
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),,,,,,,( 87654321 ggggggggD  and because of the fact that 
kg
D
∂
∂  does not depend on kg  . Moreover 
0<∂
∂
kg
D : 
;0)1( 854863
1
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D ;0)1( 763745
2
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D ;0)1( 762861
3
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D  
;0)1( 851527
4
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D ;0)1( 841742
5
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D
;0)1( 732318
6
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D ;0)1( 632524
7
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D
;0)1( 541316
8
<−−⋅=∂
∂ gggggg
g
D  
From this it follows that the minimum value is reached by D only on the right border, i.e. 
 
[ ]( ) 01)()()1()1(
    
7153
10;7,5,3,1,10
:,,,
10
;;;
;7,5,3,1,10:,,,
4,..1,10
;;;
;7,5,3,1,10:,,,
;;;
;8,...1,10:
min
)min()min()min(
7531
78563412
7531
748536324112
7531
487365243121
>−−⋅−⋅+⋅−=
=≥≥≥
<<=∀<<
<<
−=−=−=−=
=∀<<
=∀<<
−=−=−=−=
=∀<<
≤+≤+≤+≤+
=∀<<
ggggaa
D
akg
gggg
a
gaggaggaggag
kggggg
ia
gaggaggaggag
kggggg
aggaggaggagg
kgg
k
k
i
kkk
DDD
 
as ;11   ;11   ;10 7153 <−<−<−<−<< gggga    (here { }4321 ,,,max aaaaa = ). 
It is proved D>0.   
It allows to assert that the system (4.23) has the sole decision: 
D
D
t
v
D
D
t
v
D
D
t
q
D
D
t
q 4
*
1312
*
111 ;;; =∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂ , where 
10
10
010
00
87
6
4
21
1
gg
gg
g
gg
D = ;
100
1
00
001
8
65
43
2
2
g
ggg
gg
g
D = ;
100
0
01
001
7
65
43
1
3
g
ggg
gg
g
D = ; 
00
10
001
01
87
5
3
21
1
gg
gg
g
gg
D = . 
From the conditions (4.24) we get: 
0))1(( 8417421 >+−⋅−= gggggggD ; 0)( 23842 <+= gggggD ; 
0)1( 31743 <−+−= gggggD ; 0))1(( 7323184 >−−⋅= gggggggD . 
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Thus, .0;0;0;0
*
11
*
11 >∂
∂<∂
∂<∂
∂>∂
∂
t
v
t
v
t
q
t
q  
The similar calculations give conditions:   .0;0;0;0 *
1
*
*
1
*
1
*
*
1 >∂
∂<∂
∂<∂
∂>∂
∂
t
q
t
q
t
v
t
v  
Proof of Corollary 4.3.: 
From the proved Lemma 4.2 the equality is fair: 
0
)(1
)1(
3174
841742
3
1
1
1
<+−
+−−==
∂
∂∂
∂
gggg
gggggg
D
D
t
v
t
q
. 
In order to show that 1
1
1
−>
∂
∂∂
∂
t
v
t
q
 It is enough to show that 
8417423174 )1()(1 gggggggggg +−>+− ⇔ 0)1()(1 8417423174 >−−−+− gggggggggg  
From (4.24) we get, 
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The last estimation proves that  
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∂ 11 α , where )0,1(−∈α . 
 It is similarly proved that *
*
1
*
*
1
t
q
t
v
∂
∂=∂
∂ β , where )0,1(−∈β . Proved. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.:  As the proof in the most general case is very voluminous, we shall prove 
the given theorem for the case N=1 (one home firm) and N * = 1 (one foreign firm). 
 I) In the beginning we shall prove, that for the given two-part politics 11 ),~,( Xtvex ∈= ,  
22 *),~*,( Xtqex ∈=  home and foreign governments there is Nash equilibrium on the second step when 
the firms play an equilibrium Curnout and then we shall consider Nash equilibrium between governments 
of the two countries on a first step. Let's remark that 
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0'' 1
1
1 <−+⋅=∂
∂ cpqp
q
π , for Qq €1 ≥ , as 0)( <′ Qp  (by the data 2)) and )(')( 111 qcqp < , under Qq €1 ≥  
(by the data 5)). Then profit in a point Q€ bigger than in any point Qq €1 ≥ . Thus maximization 1π  by 
1q under 01 ≥q  is reduced to a maximization on a segment ]€,0[ Q . Similarly we obtain that a 
maximization *1π  by *1v  under 0*1 ≥v  is reduced to a maximization on a segment ]€,0[ *Q . Then taking 
into account the imposing of quota  by *1q  and 1v  we get that ]~,0[],~,0[ 1
*
1 vvqq ∈∈ . Thus maximization 
),( *111 qqπ  by ),( *11 qq  can be considered on a compact set ]~,0[]€,0[3 qQX ×= , and maximization 
),( *11
*
1 vvπ  by ),( *11 vv  - on a compact set ]€,0[]~,0[4 QvX ×= . 
II) As on a condition 2) function 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈ , by the data 1) 2)( Cqc ∈  and 2* )( Cvc ∈  then 
functions ),( *111 qqπ and ),( *11*1 vvπ  are continuous.  
III) As according to the conditions 1) and 2) the theorems guarantee the following conditions: 
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The conditions (4.27) guarantee a concavity of functions ),( *111 qqπ and ),( *11*1 vvπ .  
IV) Thus from I), II) and III) on the basis of the theorem of Nash it follows that there is an Curnout 
equilibrium on the second step of the game )),(),,(()),,(),,(( *0*1
*0
1
*0*
1
*0
1 ttvttvttqttq . 
 Now we shall return to the first step of the game and we shall consider the game between 
governments. Let's show that the conditions of the theorem guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium 
on the first step as well, an consequently the existence of the perfect subgame Nash equilibrium, which 
will make the optimum two-part trade policy. (It is necessary to notice, that in early works concerning the 
  
55
two-part trade policy the a game situation have never appeared at a level of governments, at earlier 
governments solved simple optimization problem, e.g. Fuerst and Kim (1997)). 
V) In the beginning we shall show that the problem of maximization ),( *ttG  by t can be considered on a 
segment (compact set) X1= ],[ вн tt  and the problem of maximization ),(
** ttG  by t* can be considered on 
a segment (compact set) X2= ],[ ** вн tt . This fact immediately comes from continuity and limitation of 
functions ),(),,(),,(),,( **1
*
1
**
1
*
1 ttvttvttqttq .  
VI) As 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈  ; 2)( Cqc ∈  and 2* )( Cvc ∈ , then functions  
)),((),(),( *1
**
1
* ttvcttvpttG −⋅= ;  )),((),(),( **1**1*** ttqcttqpttG −⋅=  are continuous.  
VII) Further we shall prove concavity of functions ),( *ttG  and ),( ** ttG  by t и t* accordingly.  
We differentiate function ),( *ttG  twice by  t : 
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We shall use the Lemma 4.2 which  was previously proved by author of the project: 
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And then if 0"<p   then the estimation is fair 
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if 0"≥p   then the estimation is fair 
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Thus function ),( *ttG  is concave by t. Similarly we obtain a concavity ),( ** ttG  by t*. 
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VIII) So, from  V), VI) and VII) On the basis of the Nash theorem it follows that there is Nash 
equilibrium on the first step of the game ( )0*0 , tt . From IV) and VIII) it follows that in the game Г there 
exists perfect subgame Nash 
equilibrium: )),(),,(()),,(),,((),,~,(),,~,( *0*1
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1
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1
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0*00*0000 ttvttvttqttqtqetveX = ,  where  
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),(~ 0*001
0 ttvv = ,   ),(~ 0*00*10 ttqq = . Proved. 
Proof of Corollary 4.4.: 
As the existence of the optimum policy is proved in the theorem now it is possible to return to a problem 
of its searching.   Differentiating functions ),( *ttG  и ),( ** ttG  by t and t* accordingly,  we get: 
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From (4.29), Lemma 4.2 condition 2) Theorem 4.2 we get that  
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The conditions (4.30) imply that the optimum two-part tariff is a subsidy. Thus the optimum payment for 
the license is equal to flowing sales proceeds of a foreign firm: 
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Proof of Theorem 4.3:  As the proof in the most general case is very volumeous, we shall prove the 
given theorem for the case N=1 (one home firm) and N * = 1 (one foreign firm). 
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 I) In the beginning we shall prove, that for the given two-part politics 11 ),~,( Xtvex ∈= ,  
22 *),~*,( Xtqex ∈=  home and foreign governments there is Nash equilibrium on the second step when 
the firms play an equilibrium Curnout and then we shall consider Nash equilibrium between governments 
of the two countries on a first step. Let's remark that 
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π , for Qq €1 ≥ , as 0)( <′ Qp  (by the data 2)) and )(')( 111 qcqp < , under Qq €1 ≥  
(by the data 5)). Then profit in a point Q€ bigger than in any point Qq €1 ≥ . Thus maximization 1π  by 
1q under 01 ≥q  is reduced to a maximization on a segment ]€,0[ Q . Similarly we obtain that a 
maximization *1π  by *1v  under 0*1 ≥v  is reduced to a maximization on a segment ]€,0[ *Q . Then taking 
into account the imposing of quota  by *1q  and 1v  we get that ]~,0[],~,0[ 1
*
1 vvqq ∈∈ . Thus maximization 
),( *111 qqπ  by ),( *11 qq  can be considered on a compact set ]~,0[]€,0[3 qQX ×= , and maximization 
),( *11
*
1 vvπ  by ),( *11 vv  - on a compact set ]€,0[]~,0[4 QvX ×= . 
II) As on a condition 2) function 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈ , by the data 1) 2)( Cqc ∈  and 2* )( Cvc ∈  then 
functions ),( *111 qqπ and ),( *11*1 vvπ  are continuous.  
III) As according to the conditions 1) and 2) the theorems guarantee the following conditions: 
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The conditions (4.33) guarantee a concavity of functions ),( *111 qqπ and ),( *11*1 vvπ .  
IV) Thus from I), II) and III) on the basis of the theorem of Nash it follows that there is an Curnout 
equilibrium on the second step of the game )),(),,(()),,(),,(( *0*1
*0
1
*0*
1
*0
1 ttvttvttqttq . 
  
58
 Now we shall return to the first step of the game and we shall consider the game between 
governments. Let's show that the conditions of the theorem guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium 
on the first step as well, an consequently the existence of the perfect subgame Nash equilibrium, which 
will make the optimum two-part trade policy.  
V) In the beginning we shall show that the problem of maximization ),( *ttW  by t can be considered on a 
segment (compact set) X1= ],[ вн tt  and the problem of maximization ),(
** ttW  by t* can be considered on 
a segment (compact set) X2= ],[ ** вн tt . This fact immediately comes from continuity and limitation of 
functions ),(),,(),,(),,( **1
*
1
**
1
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1 ttvttvttqttq .  
VI) As 2** )(),( CQpQp ∈  ; 21 )( Cqc ∈  and 2* )( Cvc j ∈ , then functions  
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−−= ∫  are continuous.  
VII) Further we shall prove concavity of functions ),( *ttW  and ),( ** ttW  by t и t* accordingly.  
We differentiate function ),( *ttW  twice by  t : 
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We shall use the Lemma 4.2 which  was previously proved by author of the project: 
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Thus function ),( *ttW  is concave by t. Similarly we obtain a concavity ),( ** ttW  by t*. 
VIII) So, from  V), VI) and VII) On the basis of the Nash theorem it follows that there is Nash 
equilibrium on the first step of the game ( )0*0 , tt . From IV) and VIII) it follows that in the game Г there 
exists perfect subgame Nash 
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),()),((),()),(),(( 0*00*1
0*0*00*
1
0*00*
1
0*00*
1
*000
1
*0* ttqtttqcttqttqttvpe ⋅−−⋅+= , 
),()),((),()),(),(( 0*001
00*00
1
*0*00
1
0*00
1
*000
1
0 ttvtttvcttvttvttqpe ⋅−−⋅+= , 
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0 ttvv = ,   ),(~ 0*00*10 ttqq = . Proved. 
From the given theorem we get a remarkable corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 4.5.  : 
As the existence of the optimum policy is proved in the theorem now it is possible to return to a problem 
of its searching.   Differentiating functions ),( *ttW  by t   we get: 
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From (15), Lemma 4.2 and  Corollary 4.2  we get that  
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Similarly we get that 0),(
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The conditions (4.36) and (4.37) imply that the optimum two-part tariff is a subsidy. Thus the optimum 
payment for the license is equal to flowing sales proceeds of a foreign firm: 
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Proof of Lemma 5: 
Let 12
*0 cct −<< . There cannot be an equilibrium in which both *1p and *2p  are strictly above 2c . Firm 
2 does not charge less than 2c  (it would make a negative profit if it sold). Firm 1 can guarantee itself a 
profit as close as possible to )()()( 2
*
212 cDtcDсс ⋅−⋅−  by charging ε−2c (with ε  small and positive). 
But since the market price (the minimum of the two prices) does not exceed 2c , this profit is also the 
highest that firm 1 can obtain. One can define the equilibrium as the limit, so 2
*
1 cp = and firm 1’s profit 
is )()()( 2
*
212 cDtcDсс ⋅−⋅− . When 21 )( ccpm < , firm 1 can charge its monopoly price without 
worrying about firm 2’s threat. Then optimal two-part policy is the positive tariff:  
)(),( 1212
* cpcifcct m≤−= , in this case )()(,0,0 2*12*max*2 cDccGe ⋅−===π  and 
)(),)(( 1211
* cpcifccpt mm >−= , in this case ))(())((,0,0 1*11*max*2 cpDccpGe mm ⋅−===π . 
If );0( 12
* cct −∉ , then G* = 0.  
